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Abstract
In this dissertation I offer three independent studies that each contribute to the literature
on the impact of income on family and child well-being. I present three essays that investigate
three different contexts and sources of income variation. First I investigate the extent to
which an unconditional cash transfer to families in Germany that is intended to benefit
children actually translates into an improvement in the circumstances related to child well-
being. Next I analyze how shocks to mothers’ earnings impact their demand for health inputs
during pregnancy, and how this affects the health of the newborn child. The fourth chapter
focuses on a non-cash transfer program. I investigate whether families who are receiving food
stamp benefits may be disadvantaged compared to higher income families due to the fact
that those families who receive food stamps necessarily incur a time cost of food preparation
when using food stamps to purchase food.
viii
Chapter 1. Introduction
This dissertation consists of three essays that each contribute to the literature on the
impact of income on family and child well-being. In the second chapter, I investigate the
extent to which an unconditional cash transfer to families in Germany that is intended to
benefit children actually translates into an improvement in the circumstances related to
child well-being. In the third chapter, I analyze how shocks to mothers’ earnings impact
their demand for health inputs during pregnancy, and how this affects the health of the
newborn child. The fourth chapter focuses on a non-cash transfer program. I investigate
whether families who are receiving food stamp benefits may be disadvantaged compared to
higher income families due to the fact that those families who receive food stamps necessarily
incur a time cost of food preparation when using food stamps to purchase food.
1.1 The Impact of the German Child Benefit on Child
Well-Being
The German Child Benefit (“Kindergeld”) is paid to legal guardians of children as a cash
benefit and the amount of the benefit does not depend on household income or other house-
hold characteristics. In the second chapter of this dissertation I present a study that employs
exogenous variations in the amount of child benefit received by households in Germany to
investigate the extent to which these various changes have translated into an improvement in
the circumstances of children related to their well-being. I use the German Socio-Economic
Panel to estimate the impact of a given change in the child benefit on food expenditures of
households, the probability of owning a home, the size of the home, as well as the probability
of parents’ smoking, alcohol consumption, and parents’ social activities such as traveling,
visiting movie theaters, going to pop concerts, attending classical music concerts or other
cultural events. I also test for the existence of a labeling effect, which would suggest that
families treat general household income different from income that is received with no strings
attached, but is understood to be used for benefit of their children.
Child benefit programs from countries other than Germany have been studied in the
previous literature. However, there are several aspects of my study that make an important
contribution to the literature. First, I am able to very cleanly identify the effect of child
benefit on the outcomes of interest because the longitudinal nature of the data set I am
using allows me to exploit within-family variations in the child benefit. Holding constant
all time invariant unobservable household characteristics is a significant improvement over
previous studies, which have struggled in their cross-sectional research designs to separate the
effects of changes in the child benefit from other changes in family characteristics. Moreover,
I am able to investigate whether parents may use the child benefit for their own personal
entertainment purposes, such as for going to the movie theater, attending pop music concerts,
or participating in cultural events. These outcomes have not been studied in the previous
literature.
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1.2 The Impact of Mothers’ Earnings on Health Inputs
and Infant Health
In Chapter 3 I investigate the impact of mothers’ earnings on birth weight of infants. I
also analyze the impact of income on mothers’ consumption of prenatal medical care, and
mothers’ propensity to smoke and drink during pregnancy. The paper uses state- and year-
specific skill-biased technology shocks as an instrument for mothers’ earnings and employs a
two-sample instrumental variables strategy. I use nearly 85 million records of births between
1978 and 2004 from the Natality Detail files along with the CPS Annual Demographic Files
from the same period. I classify mothers by education and marital status and investigate
separately for each type of mother the impact of an increase in income on the demand for
health inputs, as well as the effect of increases in income on infant health.
There are several novel aspects to this study. First, in this study I use the universe of
all births in the United States observed at the individual level. This allows for a direct
investigation of health outcomes (such as birth weight) and health input demand (such as
prenatal care, cigarette smoking, and alcohol consumption) in the population of infants born
the United States between 1978 and 2004, and it eliminates the need for standard errors
in my regressions. Second, using a measure of state-level skill-biased technology change as
an instrument for mothers earnings allows me to deal with the endogeneity of income in an
instrumental variables framework. Unobservable characteristics of mothers’ that determine
her income are likely correlated with other unobservable characteristics that determine health
input demand and efficiency in birth weight production. Therefore finding an appropriate
instrument for income is essential. Income measures are not available in the universe of birth
certificates, but I am able to combine information from the Current Population Survey’s
Annual Demographic File with the birth certificate data in a two sample two-stage least
squares empirical strategy.
1.3 Food Stamps and the Time Cost of Food Preparation
In the fourth chapter I use a structural model of time allocation between household pro-
duction and market work in order to estimate the shadow wage of household production.
I combine data from the American Time Use Survey and the Current Population Survey’s
Food Security Supplement to estimate the time cost as well as the total cost of food prepa-
ration at home. Using information on whether a household received food stamp benefits,
I compare actual food stamp recipients’ time cost to those who do not receive food stamp
benefits. Previous literature that also uses American Time Use Survey data suggests that
“typical” food stamp recipients incur a higher time cost of preparing food at home. I can-
not confirm this finding using actual data on food stamp recipients and non-recipients. In
fact, the lower shadow wage of household production of food stamp recipients more than
offsets the larger amount of time spent preparing food at home, generating lower time cost
of food preparation for them. This study informs the debate about the future of the US
Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program.
The findings of the three studies are summarized in Chapter 5.
2
Chapter 2. The Impact of the German Child
Benefit on Child Well-Being
2.1 Introduction
The parents of children in Germany receive a monthly child benefit (“Kindergeld”) for every
child. This benefit is not means-tested and all German and EU citizens living in Germany
qualify for it.1 The Child Benefit is at the core of all family support policies in Germany
and the Federal Constitutional Court has confirmed that it is intended to ensure that chil-
dren’s needs are met in terms of nutrition, housing, clothing, personal hygiene, and heating
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1998). Since the benefit is not provided in-kind but rather as a
cash transfer to the parents, how much of the additional income is actually used to improve
the well-being of children remains an open empirical question.
While there exists some literature investigating the impact of child benefit systems in
different European countries and Canada, this study is the first to investigate the impact of
child benefit income on various dimensions of household expenditures and parental behavior
in Germany. More importantly, this paper contributes to the literature by cleanly identifying
the effect of the child benefit. I use a panel data set of households and exploit exogenous
intra-household variation in the amount of the benefit to isolate its effect on the outcomes of
interest. Using within-household variation of child benefit income in a panel of households
and controlling for various time-varying household characteristics overcomes the identifica-
tion problem of separating the effect of a child benefit from the effects of differences in the
number of children, ages of children, and other confounding factors noted in the previous
literature (Edmonds, 2002).
Standard economic theory of consumer choice predicts that the source of any additional
household income is irrelevant in determining how that additional income is spent. If families
maximize a joint utility function, then a cash transfer shifts out the family budget constraint
and the change in expenditures resulting from the shift in the budget constraint does not
depend on the source of the additional income. An increase in child benefit will result in
the same Engel curves as would an increase in other types of household income.2 However,
1Parents who are German citizens but live abroad may be eligible if they earn income that is fully
taxable in Germany. Non-EU citizens may be eligible for child benefit depending on their immigration
status. The details of the eligibility rules can be found in §62 Einkommensteuergesetz (EStG) and §1
Bundeskindergeldgesetz (BKGG).
2Households do no necessarily have to make decisions as a unit for this result to hold: Becker (1981)
describes a model in which one person in the household controls all household resources, but is altruistic
toward other members of the family. In this case a different intra-household distribution of income does also
not result in different consumption patterns for the household. On the other hand, the model developed by
Lundberg and Pollack (1993) predicts that cash transfer payments to the mother and payments to the father
can imply different consumption patterns for the household (also see Browning et al., 1994). Lundberg et al.
(1997) and Schady and Rosero (2008) provide empirical support for the theoretical results of Lundberg and
Pollack (1993).
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Thaler (1990) provides evidence suggesting that individuals do not treat cash income from
different sources as perfectly substitutable (also see Thaler, 1999). He argues that “mental
accounts” attach labels to income from different sources and that the marginal propensity
to consume may be different for each of the income sources.
The labeling effect described by Thaler (1990) has been studied empirically in the context
of child benefit. Kooreman (2000) used repeated cross sections of Dutch consumer expendi-
ture surveys to investigate the effect of the Dutch child benefit system on parents’ spending
behavior. He found that the effect of an increase in child benefit income on child clothing
expenditures is larger than the effect of an increase in income from other sources on child
clothing expenditures for households with only one child. Kooreman suggested that this may
be caused by a labeling effect, where parents keep “mental accounts” as proposed in Thaler
(1990). However, in Kooreman’s study this labeling effect vanished in households with more
than one child: larger Dutch families did not distinguish between child benefit income and
income from other sources. In a related study, Edmonds (2002) used cross-sectional house-
hold data of the Slovenian child benefit program from 1993 to investigate the impact of the
child benefit on household expenditures for food, tobacco, alcohol, and clothing. He found
no significant effect of child benefit income for any of the above expenditures and concluded
that there was no labeling effect.
Most recently, Blow et al. (2012) examined the United Kingdom’s Child Benefit program.
They studied the time period of 1980-2000 and relied on variation in the real child benefit
due to the fact that the government imperfectly accounted for inflation when adjusting
the nominal child benefit, and that the amount of child benefit received for the first child
increased considerably on two occasions due to a policy change. They found that up to half
of a marginal dollar of an increase in the UK child benefit is spent on alcohol. Changes in
the UK’s Child Benefit policies have also been used by Lundberg et al. (1997) to show that
expenditure patterns are different when the child benefit is paid to the mother, compared to
when it is paid to the father. They show that expenditures on women’s and child clothing
increased when a reform of the UK’s system transferred the payout of the benefit from the
head of household to the mother.3
Given these sharply different results, this paper adds to the evidence on the effects of
child benefit income. Data limitations prevent me from analyzing the impact of child benefit
on expenditures for child-specific goods, such as toys or child clothing. Instead, I estimate
a number of household-level equations explaining households’ choices regarding food ex-
penditures and housing. I also investigate individual-level equations to see how parents’
consumption patterns change in response to changes in child benefit. In particular, I in-
vestigate whether variations in child benefit impact parents’ consumption of cigarettes and
alcohol, parents’ personal entertainment activities, participation in cultural events, as well as
vacation travel. Some of these commodities are clearly unrelated to child well-being; others
could be related, as I explain later in this section. The results provide insights into whether
the child benefit is spent according to the intention of the policy maker.
There is a strong relationship between food expenditures and child well-being, as well as
between the housing arrangement of families and child well-being. Food expenditures are
3Also see Milligan and Stabile (2011), who examined the impact of province level variations of the child
benefit in Canada on child outcomes.
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directly related to food security (Nord et al., 2010).4 Furthermore, previous work has shown
that food expenditures are highly correlated with dietary quality. For example, Mabli et al.
(2010) found that food expenditures of low income households are positively related to the
proportion of fruit and vegetables in the households’ diet, nutrient density, and expenditure
shares of foods recommended for frequent consumption. The authors also found that energy
density and expenditure shares on foods that are not recommended for frequent consumption
decrease in food expenditures. Since the well-being of children improves when they are eating
a healthier diet at home, it is important to investigate how child benefit income affects per
person food expenditures in the household.
Regarding housing outcomes, Green and White (1997) found substantial effects of home
ownership on child outcomes. In particular, they found that residential stability associated
with home ownership is correlated with higher school attainment of children, keeping family
income constant. Aaronson (2000) confirms this finding after accounting for more detailed
observable family characteristics and attempting to control for endogeneity of homeowner-
ship. In addition to ownership, the size of the home also plays a role in child well-being.
Crowding occurs when the physical size of the home is too small for the number of family
members, and Goux and Maurin (2005) find a negative causal effect of overcrowded housing
conditions on academic performance of children. I estimate the impact of child benefit on
the probability of home ownership, as well as the size and number of rooms in a home.
Since the child benefit is fungible, parents may use child benefit to support their con-
sumption of cigarettes and alcohol, or other commodities that are unrelated to the well-being
of children. It is not the intention of the policy maker to encourage parents to smoke or
drink alcohol, and therefore I also estimate a number of individual-level equations explain-
ing parents’ smoking and drinking behavior. The literature on the economics of smoking
finds the income elasticity of smoking cigarettes varies systematically over time and across
countries (Cheng and Kenkel, 2010; Wilkins et al., 2001). There is a strong income gradient
in cross sections indicating that lower income individuals are more likely to smoke in the
United States, as well as in Germany (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000; Nocon et al., 2007).
At the same time, recessions (i.e. time periods when average incomes are low) are associ-
ated with improvements in health behaviors such as smoking and drinking (Ruhm, 2000,
2005), Chaloupka and Grossman (1997) showed that income is positively associated with
smoking for youths, and Kenkel et al. (2011) found that smoking is a normal good for low
income households with children. In order to test whether child benefit contributes to par-
ents smoking or drinking, I estimate the impact of child benefit on smoking participation, the
number of cigarettes smoked (conditional on smoking), as well as the probability of regularly
consuming alcohol.
In addition to the health behaviors related to smoking and drinking, I test whether parents
use the benefit to pay for their social activities and personal entertainment activities. These
activities include visits to the movie theater or pop music concerts, attending the opera,
public lectures, or participating in other cultural events, as well as making excursions or
taking short vacation trips. The personal entertainment activities of the parents, such as
going to the movies or pop music concerts are unrelated to child well-being. On the other
4This relationship can be considered mechanical: Food security arises due to a lack of resources (and
specifically due to a lack of money) to purchase food.
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hand, making excursions or going on day trips may include trips to the zoo or amusement
parks. Therefore, this activity may be positively related to the well-being of children.
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel from 1998 to 2009, I find that house-
holds largely use the child benefit as intended by the policy maker. Households respond to
increases in child benefit income by increasing per capita food expenditures. Specifically,
households spend between 49 and 74 cents out of each additional Euro of child benefit on
food. This effect is larger for low-income households compared to high-income households.
Outcomes related to housing also improve, especially for parents with younger children. Ad-
ditional child benefit income is associated with a marginally larger home, and an increased
likelihood to own a home instead of renting. I do not find any evidence that parents increase
smoking or drinking alcohol in response to increases in child benefit. However, parents of
older children (at least 18 years old) who still receive child benefit are more likely to use
child benefit for their own social activities and are more likely to attend pop concerts, go to
the movies, or go to the opera/theater at least once a month. When investigating whether
there is a difference in how low income household respond to an increase in child benefit, I
find that low income households have larger increases in per capita food expenditures, but
the magnitude of the effect is smaller for housing conditions compared to households who
are not at risk of poverty.
I also find evidence for a significant labeling effect. Households spend more of every
marginal Euro of child benefit on improving nutritional quality and on improving housing
conditions, in comparison to an additional Euro from other sources of income.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the background
of the child benefit in Germany. Section 2.3 presents the empirical strategy and describes
the data. I discuss the results in section 2.5 and provide robustness checks in section 2.6.
Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Background of the Child Benefit in Germany
The basic idea of the child benefit in Germany is as follows:5 The living wage of an individual
or couple is not subject to income tax and only income that exceeds the level of living wage
(“Grundfreibetrag”) is taxable.6 Households with children are eligible for an additional tax
deduction for each child (“Kinderfreibetrag”), but this additional deduction is not considered
when calculating tax withholdings. Instead, families with children receive a monthly child
benefit in cash. The cash benefit is strictly a function of the number of children; that is,
household income or other considerations are irrelevant. All children are generally eligible
until they turn 18 years old. Thereafter, the parents may still receive child benefit for the
child until the child turns 25 if certain conditions regarding employment status and earnings
of the child are met. For instance, a family may continue to receive child benefit for a child
5In this section I describe the child benefit system in place during 1996–2011. See Ruhl (1994) for an
interesting historical perspective on different approaches to family policy in Germany starting with the early
1900s.
6This is equivalent to a “personal exemption” in the U.S. income tax system.
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older than 18 years if the child still attends school or university.7 Conditional on the number
of children, the child benefit amount is exogenous and does not depend on any other family
characteristics. This means that a household with two children pays the same amount of
income tax as a childless but otherwise identical household with identical income; yet, the
household with children receives the cash child benefit while the childless household does
not.
At the end of the year, the Tax Office calculates the total yearly amount of cash child
benefit received by the household, and it also calculates the potential tax savings if the child
deduction would have been taken instead. For most households the total yearly cash child
benefit they received throughout the year exceeds the tax savings that would have resulted
from claiming the child deduction. In this case the household keeps the excess amount as
a transfer payment (“Förderanteil”). For households with very high income, the tax savings
from taking the child deduction exceeds the total yearly child benefit. In this case, the
household claims the deduction and pays back any child benefit received.8 The Tax Office
determines ex officio whether the child benefit or the child deduction results in larger savings
for the household and therefore this choice is not subject to household decision or to errors
by the filing household. In monetary terms, direct government expenditures due to the
child benefit and the child deduction were e38.5 billion in 2009 (about 1.6% of GNI), e36.9
billion of which were for the cash benefit and the remaining 1.7 billion for the tax deduction
(Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2010).
Taxable income is not directly observed in the data and is difficult to accurately impute.
Moreover, due to changes in the tax schedule and changes in the amount of the allowed
deduction, the taxable household income threshold, beyond which taking the tax deduction
provides a larger benefit in comparison to taking the cash payment, varies slightly over time.
Therefore, in this paper I use only the cash amount of child benefit that is paid out to
everyone throughout the year. Ignoring the possibility that households with high income
may have received an additional benefit when filing their tax return means that the amount
of cash child benefit paid throughout the year can be considered a lower bound. In 2009,
there were 17.7 million children eligible for child benefit in Germany and only 11.8% of those
children lived in households with sufficiently high household income to be considered for the
tax deduction instead of the cash benefit (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2010). Since
the majority of households receive the cash benefit, I do not expect that using the lower
bound of benefit received will have an impact on the results presented below.
7The precise conditions to be able to receive the benefit beyond the 18th birthday of the child changed
over time and are not considered in this paper.
8The current system of receiving a large cash benefit, or a tax deduction has been in place since 1996.
Prior to 1996, households received both a tax credit and a (much smaller) cash benefit payment. Previous
studies have used changes in the child benefit law as an exogenous source of income variation. For example,
Tamm (2008) used the 1996 change in the law as a “natural experiment” that increased income for households




I estimate household-level specifications as well as individual-level specifications. The out-
comes of interest used in this paper that are observed at the household level are real per
capita monthly food expenditures of the household, the probability that the household rents
their home, the size of the home measured in square meters, the number of rooms in the
home, and the amount of rent paid per month for renters. Smoking and drinking relates to
the behavior of individual persons and therefore the unit of observation is the individual par-
ent. I estimate equations describing the probability that a parent smokes, the daily number
of cigarettes that a parent consumes conditional on smoking, as well as the probability that
a parent regularly consumes alcohol. I also estimate at the individual level the probability
that parents attend pop concerts or go to the movies at least once a month, the probability
that parents go to classical concerts or attend other cultural events at least once a month,
and the probability that parents go on excursions or short vacation trips at least once a
month.
Let the outcome of interest k of household j during time t be described by the equation
Outcomekjt = fk (Yjt;Zjt) , (2.1)
where Yjt is the real net monthly household income of household j during year t and Zjt
contains other exogenous time-varying characteristics of the household. If real monthly net
household income consists of the child benefit, yjt, and income from other sources, mjt, then
Outcomekjt = fk (yjt,mjt;Zjt) . (2.2)
Kooreman (2000), Edmonds (2002), and Blow et al. (2012) assume that fk(·) is linear, and
that y and m are additively separable. This means that these papers test for a labeling effect
of child benefit by comparing the coefficients of y andm in a linear regression of expenditures
on y, m, and control variables.
Using a comparison of the coefficients of y and m from a linear regression to identify
a labeling effect relies on the assumption that child benefit income and income from other
sources are additively separable. This is a strong assumption that deserves careful attention.
Child benefit income increases households’ unearned income and therefore may have an
impact on labor supply decisions. Theoretically, increases in unearned income result in a
decrease in labor supply and there have been several studies that lend empirical support to
this theoretical prediction specifically in the context of child benefit. For example, Tamm
(2009) provided evidence to suggest that the reform of the German child benefit system
resulting in a substantial increase of child benefit payments from 1995 to 1996 reduced the
labor supply of single mothers and mothers with a working spouse. Analyzing the data
from the Canadian child benefit for 1947-1999, McNown and Ridao-Cano (2004) found that
increases in child benefit reduced female labor supply in Canada.9
9Researchers who are not specifically concerned with analyzing the effects of child benefit have also
recognized that the labor supply effect of child benefit is important. For example, Blundell and Hoynes
(2004) investigated whether a shift of the United Kingdom’s welfare policy toward in-work benefits between
1980 and 2000 had a positive effect on labor markets. The authors recognized that an increase in the
universal child benefit over the same time period may have offset some of the positive impact of the shift
toward in-work benefits on labor supply.
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Out of the previous literature on the impact of child benefit discussed above, only Koore-
man (2000) explicitly discusses labor supply concerns. Motivated by the work of Browning
and Meghir (1991) who investigated the separability of commodity demands from labor
supply, Kooreman (2000) checked the robustness of his results by estimating expenditure
equations that include as an explanatory variable a dummy for mothers’ labor market par-
ticipation, instrumented by mothers’ education level10. However, the choice of the instrument
is crucial in order to identify the correct mechanism through which household income may
change (Moffitt, 2005). The concern is that child benefit acts as a budget shifter: keeping
constant wage, it can affect labor supply due to a shift in unearned income. Under this
scenario, an increase in child benefit can decrease labor supply, which in turn can lower
household income. Since child benefit is determined strictly by the number of children in
the household, it is orthogonal to any other household characteristics, including mothers’
education level. Even if education is a valid instrument for household income, instrumenting
household income with mothers’ education does not address the fact household income may
change due to a decrease in labor supply in response to an increase in child benefit.
Due to the fact that child benefit is exogenous to everything except for the number of
children in the household, finding a good instrument is challenging. In order to nonetheless
address any concerns regarding the potential labor supply effects of the variations in child
benefit, the main results presented in this paper are based on regressions that use the lagged
value of household income as the measure of household income. Child benefit can only affect
labor supply contemporaneously and in the future, and current year child benefit does not
influence labor supply decisions in the previous year. At the same time, household income is
expected to be highly correlated across years within the same household. Variations of this
specification are explored in the robustness checks section.
I estimate the following empirical counterpart of Equation (2.2)
Outcomekjt = αkyjt + βkmj(t−1) + Zjtδk + µkj + νks + τkst + εkjt, (2.3)
where Zjt contains time varying observable characteristics of household j as well as controls
for local macroeconomic conditions captured by state level unemployment rates and an
indicator for whether Germany was in a recession during the time of the interview. µj is
a vector of household fixed effects so that the effect of child benefit can be identified from
variation in the child benefit within the households over time. νs is a set of indicators for the
state of residence of the household to account for systematic differences in behavior across
regional areas, and τst represents the set of region specific time trends to capture systematic
variation over time in each region. εkjt is an idiosyncratic error term.
When the outcome of interest is observed at the individual level instead of the household
level (e.g. for equations describing smoking participation, number of cigarettes smoked, and
the probability of regularly consuming alcohol) then Equation (2.3) becomes
Outcomekit = αkyjt + βkmj(t−1) + Zijtδk + µki + νks + τkst + εkit, (2.4)
10Edmonds (2002) also instrumented other income, although his primary concern was measurement error
in household income. He used as instruments an indicator for whether or not the household is active in
the informal sector, regular employment, entrepreneurial activities, receiving fixed incomes, and number
of persons eligible for the child benefit. While Blow et al. (2012) wrote about comparing the marginal
propensities to spend out of child benefit and other income, they actually used total expenditure less child
benefit rather than income in their estimations.
9
where the subscript i denotes the individual. Note that in this individual-level fixed effects
specification the income variables mjt and yjt are still observed at the household level, and
Zijt now also contains time-varying exogenous characteristics of the individual in addition
to the household-level characteristics used in the specification of equation (2.3).
The main results of this paper are obtained by estimating specifications according to
Equation (2.3) and Equation (2.4).11 To address concerns regarding the impact of child
benefit on fertility, I estimate specifications separately for households that have one child
and households that have two children. Households that have one child and households
with two children account for 85 percent of the observations in my sample and therefore
estimating specifications separately for households with three children or households with
four or more children would result in insufficient sample sizes. Therefore, in addition to
estimating specifications separately for households with one child and households with two
children, I estimate specifications using data on households with a varying number of children
over time. In those specifications I include a control variable for the number of children in
the household.
I also estimate specifications separately for families that have young children and families
that have older children. Families may receive the child benefit until the child is 25 years of
age. I define a household with young children to be a household in which the youngest child
is less that 18 years old. Equivalently, a household with old children is a household whose
children are all at least 18 years of age. Distinguishing between households with old children
and households with young children is interesting for two reasons. First, the child benefit is
meant to ease the financial burden of raising children and to ensure that the needs of children
in terms of nutrition and housing are met. Younger children will have different needs in that
regard compared to older children. For example, older children are more likely to live outside
of the home of the parents and no longer eat their meals at home.12 Second, in 2012 a change
in the child benefit law expanded the eligibility criteria for children over the age of 18, while
not affecting younger children.13 If parents of older children behave systematically different
from parents of younger children in terms of how child benefit is spent, then identifying this
systematically different behavior will be important in the context of the new child benefit
law.
2.4 Data
I use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to estimate specifications ac-
cording to equation (2.3) and (2.4). The SOEP is a longitudinal data set that has been in
place since 1984, with additional samples taken in 1993, 1998, 2000, and 2006 to counter
11I will also report results of regressions that include contemporaneous child benefit and household income
as a robustness check.
12During the sample period used in this study, a child that is older than 18 but less than 25 years of age
may be eligible for child benefit while the child continues her education and the child’s own income falls
below a threshold level
13Specifically, the requirement that a child’s own income falls below a certain threshold has been removed.
Since the change of the law took effect in 2012, it cannot be considered in this study and will be the subject
of future research.
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sample attrition.14 Among many other detailed household characteristics and individual
characteristics of each household member, the data also contain information regarding the
amount of child benefit received, as well as the number of children in the household (see
Wagner et al., 2007).15
The child benefit in Germany has been administered in its current form since 1996, and
therefore the sample period used in this paper is very similar to the time period during which
the current child benefit policy has been in effect.16 Some of the outcomes that I consider in
this paper are not available in all years of the survey and I will use only data from the years
1998-2009 in this paper due to data availability. While households were asked about their
housing situation in every survey year 1998-2009, data regarding food expenditures have
only been collected in the years 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007. Parents were asked
about their smoking behavior in 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008, and about their
drinking behavior in 2006 and 2008. Individuals indicated whether they go to the movies
or to pop music concerts at least once a month and whether they attend cultural events at
least once a month during the survey years 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007–2009.
Information on excursions and short vacation trips is available for the survey years 1998,
2003, and 2008. I do not hold my sample constant, but estimate all specifications using all
available data.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics and description of the variables used in this study.
Panel (a) summarizes household-level variables and Panel (b) summarizes variables observed
at the individual level. I use only data on households with children and I exclude families
that have multiple generations living in one household. The average child benefit received
by households is substantial. Families receive on average 261.79 Euro per month in child
benefit for an average of 1.73 children per household. This means that on average, child
benefit income is equivalent to about 10 percent of other household income. The youngest
child in households is on average just over ten years old and single parents make up about
14 percent of the sample. As shown in Panel (b) of Table 2.1, parents are on average about
41 years old and about 35 percent of parents are smokers.
Figure 2.1 shows that there is variation in the nominal amount and real amount of child
benefit received over time, conditional on the number of children.17 In terms of real 2005
Euros, a family with two children would receive e246.42 per month in 1998. By 2009, the
amount of the child benefit increased by about 25% to e306.54 per month for exactly the
same two children. Note also, that in real terms child benefit is not strictly increasing over
time. The amount of real child benefit was actually highest in 2002.
14In addition, in 2002 there was a separate sample taken that targeted high income households. Due to
the fact that the tax savings due to a tax credit may be larger than the sum of the monthly cash child benefit
payments for this group, I exclude the 2002 high income sample from my estimations. My results are not
sensitive to omitting or including this sample in the estimations.
15I use the official monthly amounts of child benefit for which households are eligible to correct for mea-
surement error in the reported child benefit variable. Respondents are much less likely to commit an error
when counting their children compared to remembering the precise amount of child benefit they receive.
16There was a change in 1996 in the way that the child benefit was administered in Germany. Prior to
1996, households received both a tax credit and a small cash benefit. From 1996 onward, the child benefit
system has been administered according to the description in Section 2.2.
17The nominal changes of child benefit always took effect on January first of a given year.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Panel (a) Variables Observed at the Household Level
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev Obs
Child Benefit Real Child Benefit in 2005e/month 261.79 134.54 39,598
HH Income Real Net Houshold Income in
2005e/month
2655.23 1424.60 38,084
Number of Children Number of Children in Household for
which child benefit is received
1.7322 0.8377 39,598
Only Child Household has one child 0.4549 0.4980 39,598
Two Children Household has two children 0.4012 0.4902 39,598
Three Children Household has three children 0.1125 0.3160 39,598
Four or more Children Household has at least four children 0.0313 0.1742 39,598
Single Parent Single Parent 0.1387 0.3457 39598
Age of Youngest Child Age of the youngest child in the house-
hold
10.276 6.739 39,598
Food Expenditure Total per capita monthly expenditures on
food in the household
148.59 67.77 20,590
Renter Household rents or owns their residence
(Rent=1/Own=0)
0.4543 0.4979 37,135
Size (m2) Size of the residence measured in square
meters
112.74 41.98 37,136
Number of Rooms The number of rooms in the home larger
than 6 square meters
4.5681 1.6197 37,136
Rent/m2 Rent per square meter in real
2005e/month
5.8539 1.9343 16,117
Unemployment Rate State-level unemployment rate 10.260 4.379 39,598
Recession Country is in recession in current year 0.4783 0.4995 39,598
Panel (b) Variables Observed at the Individual Level
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev Obs
Age Age of Parent 40.88 8.33 70,875
Smoking Parent Smokes 0.3535 0.4781 35,693
Number of Cigarettes Number of Cigarettes smoked per day
among smokers
16.2879 8.8358 7,985
Drinking Parent regularly consumes alcohol 0.1506 0.3577 11,159
Movies or Pop Concerts Parents go to the movies or pop music con-
certs at least once a month
0.2277 0.4194 44,089
Cultural Events Parents attend cultural events such as clas-
sical music concerts, the opera, public lec-
tures, or the theater at least once a month
0.1459 0.3531 44,111
Short Trips Parents make excursions or take short va-
cation trips at least once a month
0.2577 0.4374 16,269
Note: Net HH Income does not include the Child Benefit. Real Child Benefit and real net household income
were calculated using the overall consumer price index. Rent per square meter is deflated using the specific rent-
and-utility price index. Summary statistics for housing related variables exclude households that have receiving
subsidized public housing.
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Figure 2.1: Child Benefit Amounts, 1998-2009
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It is important to re-emphasize that, conditional on the number of children, the change
in child benefit is exogenous and does not depend on any other family characteristics. Issues
regarding the take-up of social assistance may be a concern if, for instance, a welfare stigma
discourages households to apply for support for which they may be eligible (Moffitt, 1983).
In the context of the German child benefit these issues are irrelevant. Due to the universal
eligibility of children, the child benefit is not considered social assistance in the same sense
that welfare programs are considered social assistance, and it is not associated with welfare
stigma (Frick and Groh-Samberg, 2007).
2.5 Main Results and Discussion
2.5.1 Food Expenditures
The first set of results pertains to per capita food expenditures of households. To the extent
that per person monthly food expenditures of a household are correlated with the nutritional
quality of the food consumed by that household, a positive impact of the child benefit on
per capita food expenditures would indicate that the child benefit is used according to the
intentions of policy makers. Total monthly household expenditures on food are observed
in the survey years 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007 and I construct a measure of
per person food expenditures at the household level by dividing the total real monthly food
expenditures of households by the number of household members.
Table 2.2 shows that per capita food expenditures increase significantly as child benefit
increases. Point estimates of the effect range from an increase of per capita food expenditures
by 40 cents per additional Euro of child benefit received for households with one child
(Column 1), to about 13 cents per additional Euro of child benefit for households with two
children (Column 2). Columns 3 – 6 report the impact of child benefit on per capita food
expenditures for families with a different number of children over time, controlling for the
number of children in the household. Point estimates range from an increase in per capita
food expenditures by 15 cents for families with one or two children, to an increase of 21 cents
for households with any number of children. These results are highly statistically significant,
as well as economically significant.
Table 2.2 also present the results of estimating the impact of child benefit on per capita
food expenditures separately for households that have young children (the youngest child is
under the age of age 18) and households that have older children (the youngest child is at
least 18 years old). The results for the entire sample are driven by households that have
young children present: Regardless of the number of children in the household, the coefficient
of child benefit is statistically insignificant for households with older children. The fact that
child benefit has no effect on food expenditures in households with children older than 18
years of age is intuitive. Older children are less likely to eat at home because they are more
likely to attend college, participate in job training and eat their meals outside of the home.
The results in Table 2.2 show that household income also positively impacts per capita
food expenditures. However, the effect of child benefit income is significantly larger compared
to the effect of income from other sources, indicating that there is a labeling effect in child
benefit income with respect to food expenditures. An F-test rejects that the coefficient of
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Table 2.2: The Impact of Child Benefit on Per Capita Monthly Food Expenditures in
Households.
Per Person Real Monthly Household Food Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Families with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Households with children of any age
Child Benefit 0.3971∗∗∗ 0.1299∗∗∗ 0.1482∗∗∗ 0.1614∗∗∗ 0.1829∗∗∗ 0.2070∗∗∗
(0.1091) (0.0391) (0.0358) (0.0323) (0.0303) (0.0272)
HH Income 0.0069∗∗∗ 0.0034∗ 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0030∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0009)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0004 0.0013 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 6,942 6,856 13,798 8,803 15,745 16,295
Households with young children
Child Benefit 0.4304∗∗∗ 0.1376∗∗∗ 0.1587∗∗∗ 0.1666∗∗∗ 0.1879∗∗∗ 0.1984∗∗∗
(0.1305) (0.0405) (0.0376) (0.0332) (0.0315) (0.0281)
HH Income 0.0062∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0038∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0010)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0012 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 5,067 6,292 11,359 8,182 13,249 13,793
Households with old children
Child Benefit 0.5283 0.3169 0.3071 0.1256 0.3028 0.2763
(0.3718) (0.3532) (0.2172) (0.3003) (0.2043) (0.1998)
HH Income 0.0005 -0.0021 0.0010 -0.0022 0.0007 0.0006
(0.0043) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0026)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.1565 0.3680 0.1588 0.6710 0.1394 0.1679
Observations 1,406 355 1,761 391 1,797 1,800
Note: All specifications include household fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the household level
are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an F-test
testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of other house-
hold income. Households with young children have at least one child under the age of 18 living in the
households. Families with older children have children who are all at least 18 years of age. Household
income does not include the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Measured in
Real 2005 e. Household income is lagged by one year. Other controls included in each specification are
single parent indicators, a quadratic term in the age of the youngest child, the state level unemployment
rate, dummy variables for whether the country was in a recession during a sample year, dummy variables
for states, as well as state-specific year trends. Specifications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the
number of children in the household.
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child benefit and the coefficient of other household income are identical with a p-value of
< 0.00. This is true for households with young children, as well as for the pooled sample
of households with children of any age. Since the effect of child benefit on per capita food
expenditures for households with older children is statistically insignificant, I do not find a
labeling effect for these households.
Multiplying the average household size by the estimated increase in per capita food
expenditures due to an increase in child benefit provides an estimate of how much total
household food expenditures change in response to changes in child benefit. Households with
only one child have 2.8 members on average. In this case the point estimate of the coefficient
of child benefit indicates that a one Euro increase in child benefit would result in an increase
of household food expenditures by more than one Euro. However, this point estimate is not
statistically significantly larger from the value that would suggest that all additional child
benefit is exhausted on food (p-value = 0.7141). Estimates for all other household sizes
are very reasonable and they range from an increase in total food expenditure of 49 cents
for every additional Euro of child benefit for households with one or two children, to and
increase of 74 cents per additional Euro for households with any number of children.
2.5.2 Housing
In this section I investigate the impact of child benefit income on outcomes related to housing.
In particular, I estimate the impact of the child benefit on the probability that the household
owns or rents their residence, as well as on the size of the residence.18 Questions about the
residential details of the household are asked in every wave of the survey so that changes in
the housing conditions of households can be tracked very precisely. Since most interviews in
the SOEP are completed in the first quarter of each year,19 I use the monthly amount of child
benefit received during the previous calendar year in all specifications related to housing.20
It is possible to purchase different food immediately in response to an income shock, but
housing decisions are subject to lease contracts and it may take time to find a new home.
Table 2.3 shows that the probability of renting (versus owning) a home decreases in
response to an increase in the amount of child benefit. With the exception of the specifica-
tion that employs only households with two children (Column 2), this effect is statistically
significantly different from zero regardless of the number of children in the household. The
magnitude of the effect is also very consistent across family sizes: An increase in child benefit
by about 100 Euro per month would be needed to increase the probability of home owner-
ship by one percentage point. Increases in household income also make it less likely that
a household rents their home, but the impact of an additional Euro in child benefit on the
probability of home ownership is larger than the impact of an additional Euro in household
income. Comparing the coefficient of child benefit and the coefficient of household income,
an F-test rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients are equal with a p-value of at most 0.052
for all family sizes other than households with two children.21
18I exclude from the estimations households that live in public housing.
19Two thirds of all interviews are completed by March. By April about 80% of all interviews are completed.
20This also means that in order to account for the potential contemporaneous effect of child benefit on
labor supply, I include household income lagged by two periods in all housing related estimations.
21In the interest of space, coefficients of control variables are not reported in the Tables, but are available
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Table 2.3: The Impact of Child Benefit on the Probability that Households Rent Their
Home.
Probability of Being a Renter
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Families with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Households with children of any age
Child Benefit -0.0001∗∗ -0.0001 -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0001∗ -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
HH Income -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗ -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗ -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0252 0.1539 0.0007 0.0522 0.0001 0.0002
Observations 10,829 11,628 22,457 14,875 25,704 26,581
Households with young children
Child Benefit -0.0002∗ -0.0001 -0.0001∗∗ -0.0001 -0.0001∗∗ -0.0001∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
HH Income -0.0000∗∗ -0.0000∗∗ -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗ -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0394 0.3081 0.0169 0.1197 0.0064 0.0095
Observations 7,557 10,595 18,152 13,737 21,294 22,161
Households with old children
Child Benefit -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
HH Income -0.0000∗ -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.8705 0.9440 0.5112 0.9891 0.4395 0.5022
Observations 1,775 425 2,200 463 2,238 2,242
Note: All specifications include household fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the household level
are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an F-test test-
ing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of other household
income. Households with young children have at least one child under the age of 18 living in the house-
holds. Families with older children have children who are all at least 18 years of age. Household income
does not include the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Measured in Real 2005
e. Child Benefit is lagged by one year. Household income is lagged by two years. Other controls included
in each specification are single parent indicators, a quadratic term in the age of the youngest child, the
state level unemployment rate, dummy variables for whether the country was in a recession during a sam-
ple year, dummy variables for states, as well as state-specific year trends.Specifications for Columns (3)-(6)
also control for the number of children in the household.
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The finding that increases in child benefit decrease the probability that household rent
their home is driven by households with younger children. The bottom panel of Table 2.3
shows that for households with older children, increases in child benefit have no statistically
significant effect on the probability of renting. At the same time, the impact of child benefit
on the probability of renting for households with young children is generally statistically
significant and of similar magnitude to the results for all households. It is intuitive that
child benefit does not influence the decision to rent or own in the case of households with
older children because children who are older than 18 years of age are very likely to move
out of the house soon.
Owning a home compared to renting a home can be considered an improvement in the
housing arrangement of a household, but home ownership by itself is not immediately related
to the well-being of children. The size of the home is much more important to determine
whether children are better off. Table 2.4 shows that a one Euro increase in child benefit is
associated with a larger apartment by 0.0095 square meters for households with one child.
This effect is statistically significant and the magnitude is consistent between specifications,
ranging from an increase of 0.0094 square meters per Euro for families with two or three
children, to an increase by 0.0145 square meters for households with one, two, or three
children. In terms of square feet, this means that the average home size increases by about
10 - 16 square feet for a 100 Euro increase in child benefit.
In addition to the overall home size, I also consider the number of rooms in the home. In
particular, if a child has a room to herself instead of sharing with siblings or other household
members, this is a direct improvement in housing conditions related to child well-being.
Table 2.5 present the impact of child benefit on the number of rooms larger than six square
meters in the homes of households. The effect of child benefit is positive and generally highly
statistically significant. The impact of child benefit on the number of rooms in the home is
statistically insignificant only for households with one child. On the other hand, households
with one child do increase the size of their home in square meters in response to increases in
child benefit, as shown in Table 2.4. This difference in results is consistent with the idea that
an additional room in the home will be more useful than additional square footage when
there are more children in the household.
upon request. All of the control variables in this specification have the expected signs. For example, single
parents are more likely to rent their home, while households with a larger number of children are less likely
to be renters. while statistically indistinguishable from zero, the point estimates of the coefficient of the
state unemployment rate as well as the coefficient of the recession indicator are positive.
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Table 2.4: The Impact of Child Benefit on the Size (Square Meters) of Homes of House-
holds.
Size of Home in Square Meters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Families with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Households with children of any age
Child Benefit 0.0095∗ 0.0079 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0094∗ 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0128∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0034)
HH Income 0.0008∗ 0.0006 0.0009∗∗ 0.0009∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0586 0.1045 0.0008 0.0516 0.0002 0.0007
Observations 10,829 11,628 22,457 14,875 25,704 26,581
Households with young children
Child Benefit 0.0078 0.0089 0.0131∗∗ 0.0093 0.0127∗∗ 0.0108∗∗
(0.0056) (0.0051) (0.0044) (0.0048) (0.0040) (0.0039)
HH Income 0.0006 0.0005 0.0008∗ 0.0010∗ 0.0011∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.1960 0.0949 0.0049 0.0861 0.0041 0.0145
Observations 7,557 10,595 18,152 13,737 21,294 22,161
Households with old children
Child Benefit 0.0036 -0.0033 -0.0009 0.0140 0.0035 0.0037
(0.0086) (0.0124) (0.0065) (0.0125) (0.0064) (0.0064)
HH Income -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.6754 0.7775 0.8750 0.2706 0.6073 0.5840
Observations 1,775 425 2,200 463 2,238 2,242
Note: All specifications include household fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the household
level are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an
F-test testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of
other household income. Households with young children have at least one child under the age of 18
living in the households. Families with older children have children who are all at least 18 years of age.
Household income does not include the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are
Measured in Real 2005 e. Child Benefit is lagged by one year. Household income is lagged by two
years. Other controls included in each specification are single parent indicators, a quadratic term in the
age of the youngest child, the state level unemployment rate, dummy variables for whether the coun-
try was in a recession during a sample year, dummy variables for states, as well as state-specific year
trends. Specifications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the number of children in the household.
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The significant positive impacts of child benefit on home size (Table 2.4) and the number
of rooms in the home (Table 2.5) are driven by households who have children under the
age of 18. As expected, the estimated magnitude of the impact of child benefit on housing
related variables is very small. For example, the results from Table 2.5 suggest that a 100
Euro increase of child benefit increases the number of rooms in the homes of households
by about 0.04 to 0.07 rooms, depending on the number of children in the family. However,
on the margin additional child benefit results in improvements in the housing situation of
households with children. Moreover, there is a statistically significant labeling effect for child
benefit income: parents are more likely to use additional child benefit income than income
from other sources to improve their housing situation.
There are two margins along which the child benefit may impact the consumption of
housing services. First, a household may choose to buy instead of renting. Second, a house-
hold may “move up” to a larger or otherwise improved home. For those households that
currently rent their home, an increase in income could result in changes along either mar-
gin. The household may decide to pursue home ownership, or they may choose to rent a
larger residence. On the other hand, home owners are very unlikely to go back to renting
a home due to changes in child benefit income. Moreover, since selling a home is more
costly and time consuming than terminating a lease, it is also less likely that home owners
will purchase a larger home due to the change in child benefit income. Since there may
be systematic differences in how renters react to increased income compared to owners, I
estimate separate regressions for renters and owners. Additionally, I estimate the impact of
child benefit income on the amount of rent paid per square meter.22 Rent per square meter
can be interpreted as a measure of the quality of the home and an increase in child benefit
or household income may lead to households choosing to live in an identical size, but higher
quality home.
Tables 2.6 displays the results of estimating the impact of child benefit on rent per square
meter for households who rent their home. Tables 2.7/B and 2.9/B present the results of
estimating the impact of child benefit on the home size as well as the number of rooms in
the home separately for those households who rent their home and for households who own
their home. There is no statistically significant impact of child benefit on rent per square
meter paid by households. Although insignificant, the point estimate of the coefficient of
child benefit is positive in all specifications. With respect to the size of homes, comparing
the impact of child benefit income between renters and owners shows that the effects of child
benefit on apartment size are driven by renters. Table 2.7 shows that a one Euro increase
in child benefit results in an increase in home size between 0.0093 and 0.0118 square meters
for renters, depending on the number of children in the household. Again, this effect is
driven by renters who have young children in the household. At the same time, there is no
statistically significant effect of child benefit on the size of the home for home owners (Table
2.8). Results are very similar for the impact of child benefit on the number of rooms in
the home for renters and owners. Table 2.9 shows that the number of rooms in the home
increases for renters, and that this effect is driven by households with young children. On the
22Home ownership is not always associated with regularly recurring payments since a household may be
paying a mortgage, but they may also have inherited the home, or paid off the home already in the past.
Therefore, I do not have an equivalent to monthly housing payments available for owners.
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Table 2.5: The Impact of Child Benefit on the Number of Rooms in the Homes of
Households.
Number of Rooms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Families with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Households with children of any age
Child Benefit 0.0003 0.0003∗ 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗ 0.0006∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
HH Income 0.0000 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.1662 0.0555 0.0002 0.0145 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 10,829 11,628 22,457 14,875 25,704 26,581
Households with young children
Child Benefit 0.0003 0.0004∗ 0.0005∗∗ 0.0004∗ 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
HH Income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000∗ 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.2278 0.0301 0.0039 0.0290 0.0006 0.0025
Observations 7,557 10,595 18,152 13,737 21,294 22,161
Households with old children
Child Benefit 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003)
HH Income 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗ 0.0001∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.6018 0.4553 0.2173 0.3300 0.2782 0.2595
Observations 1,775 425 2,200 463 2,238 2,242
Note: All specifications include household fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the household level
are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an F-test
testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of other house-
hold income. Households with young children have at least one child under the age of 18 living in the
households. Families with older children have children who are all at least 18 years of age. Household
income does not include the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Measured
in Real 2005 e. Child Benefit is lagged by one year. Household income is lagged by two years. Other
controls included in each specification are single parent indicators, a quadratic term in the age of the
youngest child, the state level unemployment rate, dummy variables for whether the country was in a
recession during a sample year, dummy variables for states, as well as state-specific year trends. Speci-
fications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the number of children in the household.
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other hand, the impact of child benefit on the number of rooms in the home is statistically
insignificant in every specification for home owners, as shown in Table 2.10.
2.5.3 Parents Smoking and Drinking
Parents may use child benefit to support their smoking habits if child benefit income is
fungible. Therefore, I report results on whether the child benefit has any impact on the
probability that parents smoke. As described in Section 2.3, I use a panel of individuals
instead of households for these estimations and I include individual level fixed effects. Using
an individual-level fixed effects specification eliminates the need to include other important
determinants of smoking such as age and education (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000; Cutler
and Lleras-Muney, 2010) in the estimations. Since the average parent in my sample is 41
years old, there is not enough meaningful variation in education of individuals over time
and any difference in education between parents will be captured by the individual fixed
effect.23 Child benefit is paid to the parents of a family and is not assigned to a particular
individual parent in the family. Therefore, despite the fact that estimations are performed
using individual-level data, child benefit enters the estimation equations at the household
level.24
Table 2.11 presents estimates of the impact of child benefit income on the probability of
smoking. There is no statistically significant impact of child benefit on smoking participation
and there is no significant effect of household income on smoking participation either. While
the impact of both child benefit and household income are statistically insignificant, it is
interesting to note that the sign of the point estimate of the impact of household income is
always negative, while there is no clear pattern for the coefficient of child benefit. If anything,
this could indicate that smoking may be an inferior good for parents with children. Table
2.12 shows that child benefit does not impact smoking on the intensive margin either. I
report only the impact of child benefit on the number of cigarettes smoked by parents who
have one child, parents who have one or two children, and parents with any number of
children because sample sizes are small for families with two children and for families with
two or three children. Conditional on smoking, there is no change in the number of cigarettes
consumed by parents in response to a change in child benefit, regardless of the number of
children.
Table 2.13 present results on drinking behavior. The outcome is a dummy variable that
is equal to 1 if the parent indicated to regularly consume either beer, wine, liquor, or mixed
drinks and zero otherwise.25 Blow et al. (2012) found that a large proportion of unexpected
increases in child benefit income in the UK were spent on alcohol. While I do not have data
on expenditures on alcohol, I am unable to find a significant impact on drinking behavior in
23Moreover, Goehlmann (2007) finds that smoking initiation among older individuals in Germany is not
affected by education.
24Both parents in each household are included in the estimations individually, unless the family is headed
by a single parent.
25The questionnaire includes separate questions for beer, wine, liquor, or mixed drinks. Respondents are
asked to indicate whether they consume each of these types of beverages “Regularly”, “Sometimes”, “Rarely”,
or “Never”. I consider parents to regularly drink alcohol and code the dummy variable equal to 1 if they
indicated to “Regularly” consume any one or more of the above types of beverages. Results are robust to
using different classification schemes.
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Table 2.6: The Impact of Child Benefit on the Amount of Rent Paid per Square Meter.
Rent Per Square Meter
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Families with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Households with children of any age
Child Benefit 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
HH Income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.7124 0.5425 0.5487 0.1294 0.2816 0.4419
Observations 5,285 4,281 9,566 5,498 10,783 11,129
Households with young children
Child Benefit 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
HH Income 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.4535 0.4669 0.4916 0.0972 0.1228 0.1598
Observations 3,940 3,974 7,914 5,170 9,110 9,455
Households with old children
Child Benefit 0.0022 0.0009 0.0016 -0.0004 0.0014 0.0014
(0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0009) (0.0020) (0.0008) (0.0008)
HH Income -0.0000 0.0004∗∗ 0.0001 0.0003∗∗ 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0692 0.8277 0.0729 0.7257 0.0902 0.0902
Observations 684 116 800 123 807 807
Note: All specifications include household fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the household
level are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an
F-test testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of
other household income. Households with young children have at least one child under the age of 18
living in the households. Families with older children have children who are all at least 18 years of
age. Household income does not include the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income
are Measured in Real 2005 e. Child Benefit is lagged by one year. Household income is lagged by two
years. Other controls included in each specification are single parent indicators, a quadratic term in the
age of the youngest child, the state level unemployment rate, dummy variables for whether the coun-
try was in a recession during a sample year, dummy variables for states, as well as state-specific year
trends. Specifications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the number of children in the household.
23
Table 2.7: The Impact of Child Benefit on the Size (Square Meters) of Homes for House-
holds that Rent their Home.
Size of Home in Square Meters (Renters)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Families with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Households with children of any age
Child Benefit 0.0058 0.0076 0.0093∗ 0.0090∗ 0.0118∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗
(0.0051) (0.0049) (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0036) (0.0030)
HH Income 0.0007 0.0013∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.3198 0.2014 0.0257 0.0778 0.0037 0.0007
Observations 5,488 4,522 10,010 5,787 11,275 11,626
Households with young children
Child Benefit 0.0029 0.0061 0.0081∗ 0.0082 0.0106∗∗ 0.0104∗∗
(0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0040) (0.0046) (0.0040) (0.0032)
HH Income 0.0006 0.0016∗∗ 0.0012∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.6656 0.3684 0.0899 0.1598 0.0216 0.0065
Observations 4,105 4,203 8,308 5,447 9,552 9,902
Households with old children
Child Benefit -0.0092 -0.0018 0.0002 0.0007 0.0019 0.0019
(0.0091) (0.0034) (0.0064) (0.0039) (0.0059) (0.0059)
HH Income -0.0001 -0.0009∗∗ -0.0003 -0.0010∗∗∗ -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.3221 0.7906 0.9452 0.6775 0.7098 0.7098
Observations 704 121 825 128 832 832
Note: All specifications include household fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the household level
are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an F-test
testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of other house-
hold income. Households with young children have at least one child under the age of 18 living in the
households. Families with older children have children who are all at least 18 years of age. Household in-
come does not include the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Measured in Real
2005 e. Child Benefit is lagged by one year. Household income is lagged by two years. Other controls
included in each specification are single parent indicators, a quadratic term in the age of the youngest
child, the state level unemployment rate, dummy variables for whether the country was in a recession
during a sample year, dummy variables for states, as well as state-specific year trends. Specifications for
Columns (3)-(6) also control for the number of children in the household.
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Table 2.8: The Impact of Child Benefit on the Size (Square Meters) of Homes for
Households that Own their Home.
Size of Home in Square Meters (Owners)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Families with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Households with children of any age
Child Benefit 0.0022 -0.0022 0.0043 0.0012 0.0068 0.0058
(0.0071) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0051)
HH Income -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.7243 0.7226 0.3897 0.7898 0.1761 0.2515
Observations 5,341 7,106 12,447 9,088 14,429 14,955
Households with young children
Child Benefit -0.0029 0.0007 0.0037 0.0014 0.0049 0.0040
(0.0100) (0.0059) (0.0063) (0.0055) (0.0057) (0.0060)
HH Income -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.8197 0.7911 0.4705 0.7492 0.3558 0.4665
Observations 3,452 6,392 9,844 8,290 11,742 12,259
Households with old children
Child Benefit -0.0011 -0.0084 -0.0043 0.0166 0.0018 0.0021
(0.0106) (0.0148) (0.0084) (0.0161) (0.0086) (0.0086)
HH Income -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.9348 0.5609 0.5999 0.3149 0.8474 0.8257
Observations 1,071 304 1,375 335 1,406 1,410
Note: All specifications include household fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the household
level are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an
F-test testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of
other household income. Households with young children have at least one child under the age of 18
living in the households. Families with older children have children who are all at least 18 years of
age. Household income does not include the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income
are Measured in Real 2005 e. Child Benefit is lagged by one year. Household income is lagged by two
years. Other controls included in each specification are single parent indicators, a quadratic term in the
age of the youngest child, the state level unemployment rate, dummy variables for whether the coun-
try was in a recession during a sample year, dummy variables for states, as well as state-specific year
trends. Specifications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the number of children in the household.
25
Table 2.9: The Impact of Child Benefit on the Number of Rooms in Homes of House-
holds that Rent their Home.
Number of Rooms (Renters)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Families with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Households with children of any age
Child Benefit 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004∗∗ 0.0003 0.0005∗∗ 0.0005∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
HH Income 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000∗ 0.0000 0.0000∗ 0.0000∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.3403 0.1204 0.0077 0.1659 0.0027 0.0028
Observations 5,488 4,522 10,010 5,787 11,275 11,626
Households with young children
Child Benefit 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004∗ 0.0002 0.0004∗ 0.0004∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
HH Income 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000∗ 0.0000 0.0000∗ 0.0000∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.4839 0.2508 0.0358 0.3961 0.0247 0.0326
Observations 4,105 4,203 8,308 5,447 9,552 9,902
Households with old children
Child Benefit -0.0002 0.0017 0.0002 0.0013 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0003)
HH Income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000∗ 0.0000 0.0000∗ 0.0000∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.6309 0.0983 0.6319 0.1038 0.6612 0.6612
Observations 704 121 825 128 832 832
Note: All specifications include household fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the household
level are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an
F-test testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of
other household income. Households with young children have at least one child under the age of 18
living in the households. Families with older children have children who are all at least 18 years of
age. Household income does not include the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income
are Measured in Real 2005 e. Child Benefit is lagged by one year. Household income is lagged by two
years. Other controls included in each specification are single parent indicators, a quadratic term in the
age of the youngest child, the state level unemployment rate, dummy variables for whether the coun-
try was in a recession during a sample year, dummy variables for states, as well as state-specific year
trends. Specifications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the number of children in the household.
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Table 2.10: The Impact of Child Benefit on the Number of Rooms in Homes of House-
holds that Own their Home.
Number of Rooms (Owners)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Families with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Households with children of any age
Child Benefit -0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005∗∗ 0.0005∗
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
HH Income -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.7191 0.5436 0.1090 0.1134 0.0109 0.0154
Observations 5,341 7,106 12,447 9,088 14,429 14,955
Households with young children
Child Benefit -0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
HH Income -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.6655 0.1955 0.4259 0.0946 0.0689 0.0995
Observations 3,452 6,392 9,844 8,290 11,742 12,259
Households with old children
Child Benefit -0.0001 -0.0010 0.0001 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004)
HH Income 0.0000 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0000∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0000∗ 0.0000∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.8545 0.1519 0.8071 0.1725 0.9137 0.8823
Observations 1,071 304 1375 335 1,406 1,410
Note: All specifications include household fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the household level
are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an F-
test testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of other
household income. Households with young children have at least one child under the age of 18 living in
the households. Families with older children have children who are all at least 18 years of age. House-
hold income does not include the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Mea-
sured in Real 2005 e. Child Benefit is lagged by one year. Household income is lagged by two years.
Other controls included in each specification are single parent indicators, a quadratic term in the age
of the youngest child, the state level unemployment rate, dummy variables for whether the country was
in a recession during a sample year, dummy variables for states, as well as state-specific year trends.
Specifications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the number of children in the household.
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Table 2.11: The Impact of Child Benefit on the Probability that Parents Smoke.
Smoking Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parents with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Parents with children of any age
Child Benefit 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
HH Income -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.7057 0.5492 0.4000 0.4765 0.6204 0.7265
Observations 12,756 13,157 25,913 16,973 29,729 30,773
Parents with young children
Child Benefit 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
HH Income 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.7791 0.6457 0.7993 0.4135 0.2854 0.3948
Observations 9,127 12,095 21,222 15,808 24,935 25,969
Parents with old children
Child Benefit -0.0004 0.0018 0.0008 0.0005 0.0003 0.0006
(0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0008) (0.0008)
HH Income -0.0000∗ 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.7834 0.3769 0.3575 0.8085 0.6925 0.4418
Observations 2,785 685 3,470 757 3,542 3,550
Note: All specifications include individual fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual
level are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an
F-test testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of
other household income. Parents with young children have at least one child under the age of 18. Par-
ents with older children have children who are all at least 18 years of age. Household income does not
include the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Measured in Real 2005 e.
Household income is lagged by one year. Other controls included in each specification are single par-
ent indicators, a quadratic term in the age of the youngest child, the state level unemployment rate,
dummy variables for whether the country was in a recession during a sample year, dummy variables
for states, as well as state-specific year trends. Specifications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the
number of children in the household.
28
Table 2.12: The Impact of Child Benefit on the Number of Cigarettes that
Parents Smoke.




1 1 or 2 Number of
Child Children Children
Parents with children of any age
Child Benefit -0.4689 -0.0405 -0.0139
(0.5989) (0.0291) (0.0144)
HH Income 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.4336 0.1638 0.3353
Observations 3,185 5,861 6,907
Parents with young children
Child Benefit -1.0667 -0.0535 -0.0194
(0.6309) (0.0330) (0.0153)
HH Income 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0911 0.1045 0.2020
Observations 2,371 4,845 5,875
Parents with old children
Child Benefit -2.0466 -0.0173 0.0634
(1.3411) (0.1929) (0.1251)
HH Income -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.1277 0.9290 0.6121
Observations 604 729 740
Note: All specifications include individual fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the
individual level are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income)
is the p-value of an F-test testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit
(CB) equals the coefficient of other household income. Parents with young children have at
least one child under the age of 18. Parents with older children have children who are all
at least 18 years of age. Household income does not include the Child Benefit. Both Child
Benefit and Household Income are Measured in Real 2005 e. Household income is lagged
by one year. Other controls included in each specification are single parent indicators, a
quadratic term in the age of the youngest child, the state level unemployment rate, dummy
variables for whether the country was in a recession during a sample year, dummy variables
for states, as well as state-specific year trends. Specifications for Columns (2) and (3) also
control for the number of children in the household.
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response to changes in child benefit income. Note, however that respondents to the SOEP
were asked about their drinking behavior only twice: in 2006 and 2008. During this time
there was no change in nominal child benefit and the only identifying variation in child
benefit comes from the fact that inflation decreased real child benefit between 2006 and
2008. Due to these data limitations results from the drinking behavior regressions should be
taken with caution.
2.5.4 Parents’ Social Activities
Individuals in the SOEP are also asked about leisure and social activities. In particular,
individuals indicate how frequently they attend pop concerts or go to the movies, attend
cultural events such as classical music concerts, the opera, public lectures, or the theater,
and how frequently they make excursions or take short vacation trips. All household members
who are at least 17 years old answer these questions. However, in order to investigate changes
in consumption patterns of parents in response to changes in child benefit, I consider only
parents in my estimations. If there is a labeling effect for child benefit, then we would not
expect child benefit income to be used for parents’ social and leisure activities. In particular,
since the child benefit is meant to ensure the basic needs of children are met, a labeling effect
would not earmark child benefit income for goods such as movie tickets or tickets to the opera.
In order to estimate the impact of child benefit on participation in social activities such as
going to the movies or attending pop concerts, and participating in cultural events such
as classical music concerts, the opera, public lectures, or theater performances, I create a
dummy variable for each individual parent that takes a value of one if the parent indicated
to participate in such activities at least once a month, and zero otherwise. Similarly, I
create a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the parent indicated to make excursions
or go on short vacation trips at least monthly. The results presented here are robust to
alternative definitions of this measure, for example a dummy variable indicating whether
parents participate weekly rather than monthly.
Table 2.14 shows that parents do indeed use child benefit income to attend pop concerts
or to go to the movies. The impact of child benefit on the probability of going to the movies or
to pop concerts at least once a month is positive and highly statistically significant. Based on
Table 2.14, a 10 Euro increase in child benefit results in an increased probability of attending
pop concerts or the movies at least once a month by 1.3–3 percentage points, depending on
the number of children in the household. The effect of child benefit is larger for parents who
have children that are all older than 18 years of age. The probability of going to the movies
or pop music concerts increases by 1.3–2.7 percentage points for an additional 10 Euros of
child benefit for households with young children. For households with older children, the
impact of child benefit is about four times larger. Depending of the number of children in the
household, the probability of going to the movies or attending pop concerts at least monthly
increases by 5.1–12 percentage points for a 10 Euro increase in child benefit. This means
that parents use child benefit for their own entertainment to a larger extent when children
are older, compared to when children are younger. Furthermore, the impact of an additional
Euro of child benefit on the probability that parents go to the movies or to pop concerts at
least once a month is statistically significantly larger than the impact of an additional Euro
of household income.
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Table 2.13: The Impact of Child Benefit on the Probability that Parents Regularly
Drink Alcohol.
Drinking Alcohol Regularly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parents with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Parents with children of any age
Child Benefit -0.0357 0.0467 -0.0005 0.0042 0.0016 0.0007
(0.0750) (0.0758) (0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0013) (0.0010)
HH Income 0.0000∗ -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.6339 0.5379 0.8082 0.1485 0.2289 0.4567
Observations 3,942 3,967 7,909 5,074 9,016 9,295
Parents with young children
Child Benefit -0.1051 0.0862 0.0010 0.0027 0.0021 0.0010
(0.0789) (0.0749) (0.0021) (0.0029) (0.0015) (0.0010)
HH Income 0.0000∗ -0.0000∗ -0.0000 -0.0000∗ -0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.1832 0.2496 0.6430 0.3507 0.1489 0.3537
Observations 2,635 3,521 6,156 4,581 7,216 7,491
Parents with old children
Child Benefit -0.0167 -0.0460 0.0045 0.0007 0.0029 0.0030
(0.0337) (0.0376) (0.0101) (0.0010) (0.0082) (0.0043)
HH Income 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.6201 0.2207 0.6595 0.5194 0.7225 0.4929
Observations 1,031 310 1,341 339 1,370 1,372
Note: All specifications include individual fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual
level are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an
F-test testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of
other household income. Parents with young children have at least one child under the age of 18. Par-
ents with older children have children who are all at least 18 years of age. Household income does not
include the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Measured in Real 2005 e.
Household income is lagged by one year. Other controls included in each specification are single par-
ent indicators, a quadratic term in the age of the youngest child, the state level unemployment rate,
dummy variables for whether the country was in a recession during a sample year, dummy variables
for states, as well as state-specific year trends. Specifications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the
number of children in the household.
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Table 2.14: The Impact of Child Benefit on the Probability that Parents Go to the
Movies or Attend Pop Music Concerts at least Once per Month
Going to the Movies or Pop Music Concerts Once a Month
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parents with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Parents with children of any age
Child Benefit 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
HH Income -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 15,952 16,394 32,346 21,120 37,072 38,364
Parents with young children
Child Benefit 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
HH Income -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 11,326 14,962 26,288 19,529 30,855 32,136
Parents with old children
Child Benefit 0.0123∗∗∗ 0.0051∗∗ 0.0067∗∗∗ 0.0055∗∗∗ 0.0066∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0009)
HH Income -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0000 0.0024 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 3,546 953 4,499 1,053 4,599 4,605
Note: All specifications include individual fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual level
are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an F-test
testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of other house-
hold income. Parents with young children have at least one child under the age of 18. Parents with older
children have children who are all at least 18 years of age. Household income does not include the Child
Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Measured in Real 2005 e. Household income is
lagged by one year. Other controls included in each specification are single parent indicators, a quadratic
term in the age of the youngest child, the state level unemployment rate, dummy variables for whether
the country was in a recession during a sample year, dummy variables for states, as well as state-specific
year trends. Specifications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the number of children in the household.
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Similar results hold for parents participating in cultural events, such as going to classical
concerts, the opera, public lectures, or the theater. As shown in Table 2.15, parents are more
likely to attend such cultural events as child benefit increases. Regardless of the number of
children in the family, child benefit is used to a greater extent for opera, theater, or public
lectures by parents who have older children. The impact of child benefit on the probability
of participating in cultural events is similar in magnitude, yet somewhat smaller, compared
to the magnitude of the impact of child benefit on the probability of participating in other
social events such as the movies or pop music concerts.
Increases in child benefit are also associated with an increased probability of going on
excursions or short vacation trips at least once a month (Table 2.16). However, the estimated
impact of child benefit is relatively small compared to the estimates of other activities dis-
cussed above. Moreover, contrary to the impact of child benefit on the probability of going to
the movies or cultural events, the increases in the probability of going on excursions or short
vacation trips due to an increase in child benefit are driven by households with younger chil-
dren. Since excursions of parents with young children in the household include trips such as
visits to the zoo, museums, or amusement parks together with children, this result indicates
that child benefit is used for the benefit of children.
Parents respond individually to questions about how frequently they participate in the
activities discussed above. It is likely, though not necessary, that parents go to the movies,
concerts, and trips together as couples. In about 90 percent of cases, parents in the same
households agree on whether they engage in these activities at least monthly.26 The results
in Tables 2.14, 2.15, and 2.16 are robust to restricting the estimation sample to only those
cases in which parents both agree.27
2.6 Extensions and Robustness Checks
2.6.1 The Effect of Child Benefit by Household Income Level
I investigate whether the results reported above are different for low income household and
high income households. This is relevant for two reasons: First, the political debate surround-
ing income transfers intended for children in Germany often involves claims that households
with low income and low socio-economic status may be more likely to spend benefit money
for items that are inconsistent with the intentions of the policy maker (see for example
Dassler, 2009). Second, the previous literature has found that the effects of household cash
transfers differ depending on household’s initial socio-economic status. For example, Akee
et al. (2012) investigated the impact of exogenous household income transfers for American
Indian households in North Carolina and found differential impact of the additional income
on child nutrition, depending on the initial socio-economic status of the household receiving
the transfer.
26Parents agree about going to the movies or pop music concerts at least monthly in 87% of all cases,
agree about participating in cultural events at least monthly in 93% of all cases, and agree about making
excursions or short trips at least monthly in 84% of all cases.
27Tables with results of restricting the estimation sample those cases in which parents both agree are
omitted in the interest of space. Those results are available upon request.
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Table 2.15: The Impact of Child Benefit on Cultural Events Attended by Parents
(Opera, Classical Music Concerts, Public Lectures, Theater.)
Attending Cultural Events (Opera, Classical Music Concerts,
Public Lectures, Theater) Once a Month
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parents with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Parents with children of any age
Child Benefit 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
HH Income -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 15,963 16,396 32,359 21,122 37,085 38,379
Parents with young children
Child Benefit 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
HH Income -0.0000∗ -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 11,333 14,963 26,296 19,530 30,863 32,146
Parents with old children
Child Benefit 0.0096∗∗∗ 0.0052∗∗ 0.0062∗∗∗ 0.0067∗∗∗ 0.0066∗∗∗ 0.0063∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0009)
HH Income -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0000 0.0037 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 3,551 953 4,504 1,053 4,604 4,610
Note: All specifications include individual fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual level
are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an F-test
testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of other house-
hold income. Parents with young children have at least one child under the age of 18. Parents with older
children have children who are all at least 18 years of age. Household income does not include the Child
Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Measured in Real 2005 e. Household income is
lagged by one year. Other controls included in each specification are single parent indicators, a quadratic
term in the age of the youngest child, the state level unemployment rate, dummy variables for whether
the country was in a recession during a sample year, dummy variables for states, as well as state-specific
year trends. Specifications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the number of children in the household.
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Table 2.16: The Impact of Child Benefit on the Probability that Parents Make Ex-
cursions or Go on Short Vacation Trips at least Once per Month.
Making Excursions or Going on Vacation Trips Once a Month
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parents with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Parents with children of any age
Child Benefit 0.0012 0.0008 0.0010∗∗ 0.0007∗ 0.0008∗∗ 0.0006∗
(0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
HH Income -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.2038 0.0780 0.0025 0.0331 0.0054 0.0208
Observations 5,833 5,948 11,781 7,689 13,522 13,975
Parents with young children
Child Benefit 0.0028∗ 0.0007 0.0011∗∗ 0.0006 0.0008∗ 0.0006∗
(0.0013) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
HH Income -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0264 0.1566 0.0059 0.1349 0.0181 0.0352
Observations 4,147 5,401 9,548 7,079 11,226 11,674
Parents with old children
Child Benefit -0.0044 0.0068 -0.0008 0.0068 -0.0009 -0.0008
(0.0035) (0.0048) (0.0018) (0.0048) (0.0018) (0.0017)
HH Income 0.0003∗∗ 0.0001 0.0002∗ 0.0001 0.0002∗ 0.0002∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.1912 0.1638 0.5994 0.1631 0.5540 0.5566
Observations 1,277 346 1,623 384 1,661 1,663
Note: All specifications include individual fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual
level are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an
F-test testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of
other household income. Parents with young children have at least one child under the age of 18. Par-
ents with older children have children who are all at least 18 years of age. Household income does not
include the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Measured in Real 2005 e.
Household income is lagged by one year. Other controls included in each specification are single par-
ent indicators, a quadratic term in the age of the youngest child, the state level unemployment rate,
dummy variables for whether the country was in a recession during a sample year, dummy variables
for states, as well as state-specific year trends. Specifications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the
number of children in the household.
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I am able to test whether low-income or high-income household respond differently to
changes in child benefit. In order to define what constitutes a low-income household, I refer
to the European Union’s definition of being at risk of poverty (Eurostat, 2012). Accordingly,
I classify a household to be low-income if the household that has a net household income of
less than 60 percent of the median household income of households in my sample. I create a
dummy variable that takes a value of one if a household’s net income is less than 60 percent
of the median household income in my sample, and zero otherwise.
In order to investigate whether low-income households respond differently to exogenous
changes in child benefit, I estimate a version of equation (2.3) that includes an interaction
term of Child Benefit income and the dummy variable indicating whether or not a household
is low-income.28 The results are presented in Table 2.17 and Table 2.18. In the interest of
space, I present in these tables only the results for estimations that pool households with
different number of children, and I control for the number of children in the household in
each regression.
Column 1 of Table 2.17 shows that per monthly capita food expenditures are about 23
Euros less for low-income households compared to higher income households. An additional
Euro of Child Benefit income increases per capita food expenditures by about 20 cents,
but this increase is significantly higher for low income households. The interaction term
is statistically significant at the one percent level and it is economically significant as well.
Low income households increase their spending on food by about 4 cents more per capita
compared to higher income households. Columns 2-4 of Table 2.17 show that low-income
households are more likely to rent their residence and have a smaller home on average, though
this difference is not statistically significantly different from zero. Low income have about
0.1 fewer rooms in their home compared to higher income households, and the coefficient
is statistically significant at the ten percent level. Additional child benefit income improves
housing conditions, as does additional household income from other sources. The sign,
magnitude, and statistical significance of the effects are similar to the effects presented in
the main results. However, regarding housing outcomes, the interaction terms of child benefit
and the indicator for whether a household is low-income is statistically insignificant.
Table 2.18 presents the results for individual level outcomes. In the smoking and drink-
ing equations (Columns 1 and 2) the coefficient of the dummy variable indicating that a
household is low-income is negative but statistically insignificant. Similar to the main re-
sults, there is no effect of child benefit on smoking or drinking behavior of the parents. The
interaction term is also statistically insignificant, suggesting that in terms of smoking and
drinking there is no difference in the response to increases in child benefit by parents from
low-income households or high-income households. Regarding personal entertainment activ-
ities of the parents, Column 3 shows that parents are more likely to make a visit to the movie
theater at least monthly when child benefit increases. This collaborates the main results.
However, I do not find any evidence suggesting that parents from low-income households be-
have different compared to parents from higher income households. The same is true for the
probability that parents participate in cultural activities at least monthly (Column 4) and
28It is also possible to separately estimate all of the above equations for the subsample of low-income
households. In the interest of power of the estimations, I present here only the results of estimating equation
(2.3) with the interaction term.
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Table 2.17: The Impact of Child Benefit on Food Expenditures and Housing
Conditions (by Household Income Level)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
House Number
Food Size of Rooms
Expenditures Renter (Renters) (Renters)
Low Income -23.4832∗∗∗ 0.0191 -1.9707 -0.1046∗
(4.5048) (0.0142) (1.2355) (0.0473)
Child Benefit 0.1986∗∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗
(0.0293) (0.0000) (0.0033) (0.0002)
Low Income × Child Benefit 0.0416∗∗∗ 0.0000 -0.0016 0.0000
(0.0125) (0.0000) (0.0041) (0.0000)
HH Income 0.0042∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000)
N 14,991 26,157 11,479 11,479
Note: All specifications include household fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the
household level are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Household income
does not include the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Mea-
sured in Real 2005 e. The variable Low Income is a dummy variable that takes a value of
1 if a household had a net income of less that 60 percent of the median household income
for families of the same size.
that they probability that parents make day trips or excursions at least monthly (Column
5).
2.6.2 Different Specifications
In order to test the robustness of the results obtained in this paper, I estimate several alterna-
tive specifications. My main results are based on specifications that include the lagged value
of household income as a measure of other income. This avoids the potential bias introduced
into the model if child benefit income affects labor supply and therefore wage income in the
current period. Since the previous literature did not consider this potential confounding and
estimated specifications that included contemporaneous child benefit income and household
income, I examine whether any of my results change when I also use contemporaneous child
benefit income and household income such that
Outcomekjt = αkyjt + βkmjt + Zjtδk + µkj + νks + τkst + εkjt, (2.5)
where outcomes are determined by child benefit (y) and current income (m).
Moreover, if additional child benefit income indeed causes a decrease in labor supply and
therefore a decrease in household income, then γ is negative in
mjt = γyjt + Zjtλ+ νjt, (2.6)
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Table 2.18: The Impact of Child Benefit on Parents’ Smoking, Drinking, Personal
Entertainment, Participation in Cultural Activities, and Excursions (by
Household Income Level)




Smoking Drinking Visits Participation Excursions
Low Income -0.0255 -0.0112 -0.0232 -0.0207 0.0291
(0.0172) (0.0284) (0.0185) (0.0143) (0.0417)
Child Benefit -0.0001 0.0008 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0005∗
(0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Low Income × Child Benefit 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
HH Income -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
N 30,323 9,173 37,793 37,812 13,758
Note: All specifications include individual fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual level
are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Household income does not include the Child
Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Measured in Real 2005 e. The variable Low
Income is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a household had a net income of less that 60
percent of the median household income for families of the same size.
where mjt is household income (minus child benefit) in household j during year t, yjt is child
benefit in household j during year t, and Zjt is a vector of exogenous household character-
istics. Substituting (2.6) back into Equation (2.5) results in
Outcomekjt = (αk + βkγ) yjt + Zjt (δk + βkλ) + µkj + νks + τkst + ηkjt. (2.7)
Therefore, I also estimate reduced form specifications according to Equation (2.7) that
only include child benefit on the right hand side. Since γ is expected to be negative if there
is a significant impact of child benefit on household income, then for normal goods I expect
the reduced form coefficient to be smaller in magnitude compared to the estimates of the
main results. For inferior goods (when βk is negative) the magnitude of the reduced form
coefficient would be larger. In the interest of space, I only report results of the robustness
checks for regressions that include children of any age. Separate results for families with
young children and families with older children are available upon request.
Regarding per capita food expenditures, the results obtained by estimating Equation
(2.5), where I include contemporaneous household income rather than lagged household
income, provides very similar estimates compared to the main results (See Table 2.19).
Furthermore, the small differences between the estimates of the coefficient of child benefit
do not appear to be systematic. For households with only one child and households with
two or three children, the coefficient of child benefit is smaller when estimating Equation
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Table 2.19: Robustness Checks of the Impact of Child Benefit on Per Capita Monthly
Food Expenditures in Households.
Per Person Real Monthly Household Food Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Families with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Contemporaneous Child Benefit and Household Income (Equation 2.5)
Child Benefit 0.3616∗∗∗ 0.1306∗∗∗ 0.1664∗∗∗ 0.1612∗∗∗ 0.1972∗∗∗ 0.2222∗∗∗
(0.0927) (0.0374) (0.0333) (0.0310) (0.0285) (0.0260)
HH Income 0.0111∗∗∗ 0.0056∗∗∗ 0.0089∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0081∗∗∗ 0.0077∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0009)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0002 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 8,980 7,987 16,967 10,255 19,235 19,880
Reduced Form (Equation 2.7)
Child Benefit 0.4004∗∗∗ 0.1421∗∗∗ 0.1853∗∗∗ 0.1708∗∗∗ 0.2119∗∗∗ 0.2309∗∗∗
(0.0925) (0.0369) (0.0330) (0.0307) (0.0282) (0.0255)
Observations 9,294 8,298 17,592 10,634 19,928 20,590
Note: All specifications include household fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the household level
are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an F-test
testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of other house-
hold income. Households with young children have at least one child under the age of 18 living in the
households. Families with older children have children who are all at least 18 years of age. Household
income does not include the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Measured in
Real 2005 e. Household income is lagged by one year. Other controls included in each specification are
single parent indicators, a quadratic term in the age of the youngest child, the state level unemployment
rate, dummy variables for whether the country was in a recession during a sample year, dummy variables
for states, as well as state-specific year trends. Specifications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the
number of children in the household.
(2.5) (reported in Table 2.19) in comparison to Equation (2.3) (Table 2.2), whereas for all
other household sizes the coefficient is larger. However, there is a systematic difference in the
magnitude of the household income variable. Using contemporaneous household income and
child benefit in the regression increases the point estimate of the impact of household income
on per capita food expenditures. The magnitude of the difference is not enough to erase the
labeling effect: An F-test of whether the coefficient of child benefit and the coefficient of
household income are equal rejects the null hypothesis with a p-value of < 0.00 regardless
of family size.
The results of estimating the reduced form are also presented in Table 2.19. The estimate
of the impact of child benefit on per capita food expenditures from the reduced form equation
is very similar to the estimate from the main results. Interestingly, the impact of child benefit
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on per capita food expenditures is larger in the reduced form specification compared to the
specifications that include a measure of household income. However, the difference between
the coefficients is small.
I also check whether my results are robust to running specifications that use the logarithm
of per capita food expenditures as the outcome variable. Table 2.20 shows that per capita
food expenditures increase between 0.08% and 0.25% for an additional Euro of child benefit,
depending on the number of children in the household. The impact of child benefit is
statistically significant for households with young children and households with children of
any age. Similar to the main results where I use the level of per capita food expenditure as
the outcome variable presented in Table 2.2, the impact of child benefit for households with
older children is statistically insignificant. The magnitude of the impact of child benefit is
also very similar in the log-linear specification compared to the main results. For example,
the estimated 0.08% increase in per capita food expenditures for an additional Euro in child
benefit for households with two children (Column 2 in Table 2.20) translates into an increase
in per capita food expenditures by 11.2 cents over a mean of 140.03 Euros. This is very
similar to the estimate of 12.99 cents per additional Euro in child benefit from Column 2 of
Table 2.2.
Housing related results are also robust to using different measures of household income.
Tables 2.21 – 2.23 show the results of estimating the impact of child benefit on the probability
of being a renter, the size of the home in square meters, as well as the number of rooms in the
home when using contemporaneous household income as the measure of household income
as depicted in Equation (2.5), and when estimating the reduced form specification shown in
Equation (2.7). The impact of child benefit on each of the outcomes is consistent with the
main results and numerically very similar. Table 2.23 shows that the reduced form estimate
of the impact of child benefit on the number of rooms in the house is smaller than the
estimate of the impact of child benefit when household income is included in the regression.
This is as expected, although the difference is very small.
Tables 2.24 and 2.25 show that there is no impact of child benefit on the probability that
parents smoke that parents frequently consume alcohol regardless of the measure of house-
hold income. With the exception of households with only one child present, the impact of
household income on smoking remains statistically insignificant when contemporaneous child
benefit and household income are used in the estimation. In the reduced form specifications,
the impact of child benefit on smoking is statistically insignificant regardless of the number
of children in the household, and there is no pattern in the sign of the point estimates.
Regarding parents’ social activities, Table 2.26 and Table 2.27 show that there is little
difference in the impact of child benefit between the main results based on Equation (2.3)
and the results of estimating specifications including contemporaneous child benefit and
household income according to Equation (2.5). Estimating the reduced form specification
also produces results that are consistent with the main results. When using contemporaneous
child benefit and household income in the specification, the impact of an additional Euro of
household income on the probability of participating in cultural events is generally positive
and statistically significant. The impact of an additional Euro of household income on the
probability that parents go the movies or pop music concerts at least once a month is also
positive and statistically significant for households with two or three children. This result
is expected. However, in the specifications using the lagged value of household income,
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Table 2.20: Robustness Check:The Impact of Child Benefit on Per Capita Monthly Food
Expenditures in Households using a log specification.
Log Per Person Real Monthly Household Food Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Families with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Households with children of any age
Child Benefit 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
HH Income 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0000 0.0031 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 6,942 6,856 13,798 8,803 15,745 16,295
Households with young children
Child Benefit 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
HH Income 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0001 0.0029 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 5,067 6,292 11,359 8,182 13,249 13,793
Households with old children
Child Benefit 0.0026 0.0024 0.0017 0.0011 0.0016 0.0013
(0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0011)
HH Income 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.1565 0.2749 0.1388 0.5624 0.1554 0.2362
Observations 1,406 355 1,761 391 1,797 1,800
Note: All specifications include household fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the household level
are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an F-test
testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of other house-
hold income. Households with young children have at least one child under the age of 18 living in the
households. Families with older children have children who are all at least 18 years of age. Household
income does not include the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Measured in
Real 2005 e. Household income is lagged by one year. Other controls included in each specification are
single parent indicators, a quadratic term in the age of the youngest child, the state level unemployment
rate, dummy variables for whether the country was in a recession during a sample year, dummy vari-
ables for states, as well as state-specific year trends. Specifications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for
the number of children in the household.
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Table 2.21: Robustness Checks of the Impact of Child Benefit on the Probability that
Households Rent their Home.
Probability of Being a Renter
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Families with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Contemporaneous Child Benefit and Household Income (Equation 2.5)
Child Benefit -0.0001∗∗ -0.0001∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0001∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
HH Income -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0054 0.0284 0.0000 0.0134 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 13,191 12,871 26,062 16,459 29,650 30,617
Reduced Form (Equation 2.7)
Child Benefit -0.0001∗∗ -0.0001∗ -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0001∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 13,654 13,389 27,043 17,079 30,733 31,718
Note: All specifications include household fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the household level are
in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an F-test testing the
null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of other household income.
Households with young children have at least one child under the age of 18 living in the households. Families
with older children have children who are all at least 18 years of age. Household income does not include
the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Measured in Real 2005 e. Child Benefit is
lagged by one year. Household income is lagged by two years. Other controls included in each specification
are single parent indicators, a quadratic term in the age of the youngest child, the state level unemployment
rate, dummy variables for whether the country was in a recession during a sample year, dummy variables for
states, as well as state-specific year trends. Specifications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the number of
children in the household.
the impact of lagged household income was statistically indistinguishable from zero in all
cases. Since going to the movie theater and participating in cultural events are expected to be
normal goods, the former result is more intuitive and the specification using contemporaneous
child benefit and household income may be preferred to the specification that uses the lagged
value of household income.
Since the reduced form estimates, as well as the estimates obtained from regressions that
include contemporaneous child benefit and household income are qualitatively and quanti-
tatively similar to the main results, I conclude that the impact of child benefit on household
income through the channel of labor supply is negligible.
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Table 2.22: Robustness Checks of the Impact of Child Benefit on the Size (Square
Meters) of Homes of Households.
Size of Home in Square Meters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Families with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Contemporaneous Child Benefit and Household Income (Equation 2.5)
Child Benefit 0.0092∗ 0.0094∗ 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗ 0.0150∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0034) (0.0032)
HH Income 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0008 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0858 0.0473 0.0001 0.0159 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 13,191 12,871 26,062 16,459 29,650 30,617
Reduced Form (Equation 2.7)
Child Benefit 0.0070 0.0087∗ 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗ 0.0150∗∗∗ 0.0144∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0035) (0.0040) (0.0033) (0.0031)
Observations 13,654 13,389 27,043 17,079 30,733 31,718
Note: All specifications include household fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the household level
are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an F-test
testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of other house-
hold income. Households with young children have at least one child under the age of 18 living in the
households. Families with older children have children who are all at least 18 years of age. Household
income does not include the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Measured
in Real 2005 e. Child Benefit is lagged by one year. Household income is lagged by two years. Other
controls included in each specification are single parent indicators, a quadratic term in the age of the
youngest child, the state level unemployment rate, dummy variables for whether the country was in a
recession during a sample year, dummy variables for states, as well as state-specific year trends. Speci-
fications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the number of children in the household.
2.7 Conclusion
The German child benefit is intended to ensure that children’s needs in terms of nutrition
and housing (among other things) are met. Since the benefit is paid in cash and is fungible,
I investigate whether parents really do use the child benefit for its intended purpose. I
find that households primarily increase their per capita food expenditures in response to
exogenous increases in child benefit, which should improve nutrition. Households spend on
average between 49 and 74 cents out of every additional Euro of child benefit on food. This
effect is larger for low-income households compared to high-income households. Households
that meet the European Union’s definition of being at-risk of poverty spend about 4 more
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Table 2.23: Robustness Checks of the Impact of Child Benefit on the Number of Rooms
in the Homes of Households.
Number of Rooms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Families with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Contemporaneous Child Benefit and Household Income (Equation 2.5)
Child Benefit 0.0004 0.0004∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
HH Income 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0853 0.0084 0.0000 0.0019 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 13,191 12,871 26,062 16,459 29,650 30,617
Reduced Form (Equation 2.7)
Child Benefit 0.0002 0.0005∗∗ 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 13,654 13,389 27,043 17,079 30,733 31,718
Note: All specifications include household fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the household level
are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an F-
test testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of other
household income. Households with young children have at least one child under the age of 18 living in
the households. Families with older children have children who are all at least 18 years of age. House-
hold income does not include the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Mea-
sured in Real 2005 e. Child Benefit is lagged by one year. Household income is lagged by two years.
Other controls included in each specification are single parent indicators, a quadratic term in the age
of the youngest child, the state level unemployment rate, dummy variables for whether the country was
in a recession during a sample year, dummy variables for states, as well as state-specific year trends.
Specifications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the number of children in the household.
cents of every additional Euro of child benefit on food, compared to the increase in food
expenditures for households not at-risk of poverty. Households also use child benefit to
improve their housing conditions: they are more likely to own their home instead of renting,
and are more likely to live in a larger home if they are renters.
I also find that there is a significant labeling effect for the child benefit, indicating that
households treat child benefit income differently compared to income from other sources.
An increase in child benefit income leads to larger improvements in nutrition and housing
conditions compared to an identical increase in general household income. This is consistent
with the evidence obtained in the previous literature for the Dutch child benefit. I find no
evidence that child benefit increases smoking of parents and, contrary to evidence from the
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Table 2.24: Robustness Checks for the Impact of Child Benefit on the Probability
that Parents Smoke.
Smoking Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parents with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Contemporaneous Child Benefit and Household Income (Equation 2.5)
Child Benefit 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
HH Income 0.0000∗ -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.6272 0.2834 0.2752 0.9199 0.9953 0.7319
Observations 15,131 14,014 29,145 18,074 33,205 34,329
Reduced Form (Equation 2.7)
Child Benefit 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Observations 15,718 14,643 30,361 18,824 34,542 35,693
Note: All specifications include individual fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual
level are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an
F-test testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of
other household income. Parents with young children have at least one child under the age of 18. Par-
ents with older children have children who are all at least 18 years of age. Household income does not
include the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Measured in Real 2005 e.
Household income is lagged by one year. Other controls included in each specification are single par-
ent indicators, a quadratic term in the age of the youngest child, the state level unemployment rate,
dummy variables for whether the country was in a recession during a sample year, dummy variables
for states, as well as state-specific year trends. Specifications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the
number of children in the household.
United Kingdom, I do not find that child benefit income causes parents to consume more
alcohol.
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Table 2.25: Robustness Checks of the Impact of Child Benefit on the Probability that
Parents Drink Alcohol Regularly.
Drinking Alcohol Regularly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parents with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Contemporaneous Child Benefit and Household Income (Equation 2.5)
Child Benefit -0.0664 0.0362 -0.0004 0.0039 0.0012 0.0007
(0.0911) (0.0725) (0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0012) (0.0009)
HH Income -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.4665 0.6174 0.8026 0.1413 0.3131 0.4083
Observations 4,789 4,395 9,184 5,624 10,413 10,727
Reduced Form (Equation 2.7)
Child Benefit -0.0679 0.0361 -0.0012 0.0032 0.0005 0.0004
(0.0857) (0.0719) (0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0012) (0.0008)
Observations 4,948 4,619 9,567 5,894 10,842 11,159
Note: All specifications include individual fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual
level are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an
F-test testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of
other household income. Parents with young children have at least one child under the age of 18. Par-
ents with older children have children who are all at least 18 years of age. Household income does not
include the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Measured in Real 2005 e.
Household income is lagged by one year. Other controls included in each specification are single par-
ent indicators, a quadratic term in the age of the youngest child, the state level unemployment rate,
dummy variables for whether the country was in a recession during a sample year, dummy variables
for states, as well as state-specific year trends. Specifications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the
number of children in the household.
I find that parents use child benefit for their personal entertainment activities and their
own social activities that are unrelated to the well-being of children. As child benefit income
increases, parents are more likely to go to the movies or to attend pop music concerts at
least once a month. They are also more likely to attend cultural events such as classical
music concerts, the opera, public lectures, or theater performances. Parents also use child
benefit to make excursions and to take short vacation trips.
Since parents may be eligible for child benefit up to the point when their child is 25 years
old, I investigate whether parents of older children respond differently to changes in child
benefit compared to parents of younger children. Per capita household expenditure on food
does not increase for households in which all children are older than 18 years of age, while it
does for households with younger children. Similarly, the impact of child benefit on housing
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Table 2.26: Robustness Checks of the Impact of Child Benefit on the Probability that
Parents Go to the Movies or Attend Pop Music Concerts at least Once per
Month.
Going to the Movies or Concerts Once a Month
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parents with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Contemporaneous Child Benefit and Household Income (Equation 2.5)
Child Benefit 0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
HH Income -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000∗ 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 18,834 17,368 36,202 22,305 41,139 42,512
Reduced Form (Equation 2.7)
Child Benefit 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 19,529 18,062 37,591 23,158 42,687 44,089
Note: All specifications include individual fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual level
are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an F-test
testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of other house-
hold income. Parents with young children have at least one child under the age of 18. Parents with older
children have children who are all at least 18 years of age. Household income does not include the Child
Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Measured in Real 2005 e. Household income is
lagged by one year. Other controls included in each specification are single parent indicators, a quadratic
term in the age of the youngest child, the state level unemployment rate, dummy variables for whether
the country was in a recession during a sample year, dummy variables for states, as well as state-specific
year trends. Specifications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the number of children in the household.
related variables is not statistically significant for households in which the children are older
than 18 years of age. This is not surprising because older children are less likely to live in
their parents’ household for long periods of time compared to younger children.
Interestingly, compared to the parents of younger children, parents whose children are
more than 18 years old are more likely to use child benefit for their personal entertainment
activities such as the movies or pop music concerts, and they are more likely to use child
benefit to attend cultural events such as classical music concerts, the opera, or the theater.
On the other hand, parents are more likely to use child benefit to go on day trips or short
vacations when children are young. Given this may include outings to the zoo and to
amusement parks, this is not necessarily detrimental for the well-being of young children.
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Table 2.27: Robustness Checks of the Impact of Child Benefit on the Probability that
Parents Go to the Opera or to Public Lectures at least once per Month.
Going to the Opera or Attending Public Lectures Once a Month
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parents with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Contemporaneous Child Benefit and Household Income (Equation 2.5)
Child Benefit 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
HH Income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 18,848 17,373 36,221 22,311 41,159 42,533
Reduced Form (Equation 2.7)
Child Benefit 0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 19,546 18,067 37,613 23,162 42,708 44,111
Note: All specifications include individual fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual level
are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an F-test
testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of other house-
hold income. Parents with young children have at least one child under the age of 18. Parents with older
children have children who are all at least 18 years of age. Household income does not include the Child
Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Measured in Real 2005 e. Household income is
lagged by one year. Other controls included in each specification are single parent indicators, a quadratic
term in the age of the youngest child, the state level unemployment rate, dummy variables for whether
the country was in a recession during a sample year, dummy variables for states, as well as state-specific
year trends. Specifications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the number of children in the household.
Since it is the explicit intention of the policy maker to ensure the well-being of children in
terms of nutrition and housing, these results show that the child benefit does indeed have the
desired effect for families with non-adult children. Parents improve nutrition and housing
conditions in response to an increase in child benefit when children are young, and parents do
not use the child benefit to increase smoking or drinking. Once children are older, however,
parents no longer improve nutrition and housing conditions when child benefit increases.
Rather they use the child benefit for their own social activities and entertainment, i.e. they
increase expenditures on goods that are assignable directly to the parents, not the children.
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Table 2.28: Robustness Checks of the Impact of Child Benefit on the Probability that
Parents Make Excursions or Go on Short Vacation Trips at least Once
per Month.
Making Excursions or Going on Vacation Trips Once a Month
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parents with
Any
1 2 1 or 2 2 or 3 1, 2, or 3 Number of
Child Children Children Children Children Children
Contemporaneous Child Benefit and Household Income (Equation 2.5)
Child Benefit 0.0012 0.0007 0.0010∗∗ 0.0006 0.0006∗ 0.0005∗
(0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
HH Income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p(CB = HH Income) 0.1936 0.0813 0.0019 0.0759 0.0263 0.0528
Observations 6,951 6,387 13,338 8,221 15,172 15,670
Reduced Form (Equation 2.7)
Child Benefit 0.0016 0.0006 0.0009∗∗ 0.0005 0.0006∗ 0.0004
(0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Observations 7,212 6,650 13,862 8,550 15,762 16,269
Note: All specifications include individual fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual
level are in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p(CB = HH Income) is the p-value of an
F-test testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Child Benefit (CB) equals the coefficient of
other household income. Parents with young children have at least one child under the age of 18. Par-
ents with older children have children who are all at least 18 years of age. Household income does not
include the Child Benefit. Both Child Benefit and Household Income are Measured in Real 2005 e.
Household income is lagged by one year. Other controls included in each specification are single par-
ent indicators, a quadratic term in the age of the youngest child, the state level unemployment rate,
dummy variables for whether the country was in a recession during a sample year, dummy variables
for states, as well as state-specific year trends. Specifications for Columns (3)-(6) also control for the
number of children in the household.
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Chapter 3. The Impact of Mothers’
Earnings on Health Inputs and
Infant Health
3.1 Introduction
Child health is an important ingredient in human capital formation and poor health at birth
in impacts adult outcomes. For example, low birth weight reduces educational attainment
(Case et al., 2005; Currie and Hyson, 1999). Low birth weight also has a negative impact
on labor market outcomes (Black et al., 2007; Currie and Hyson, 1999) and on health in
adulthood (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2004).
The seminal work of Grossman (1972) provides the theoretical framework of a human
capital model though which the production of health can be analyzed. In this model indi-
viduals’ health capital depreciates over time and gross investment in health can be produced
by a household production function that uses the person’s own time, and health inputs such
as medical care and healthy diet. Health inputs may include those with negative marginal
products such and cigarette and alcohol consumption.1 The initial health endowment is an
important determinant of the future stock of health. This endowment is not only deter-
mined by genetics, but it can be impacted by in-utero exposure to disease, and detrimental
environmental factors such as air pollution (Almond, 2006; Currie and Walker, 2011).
In this context it is important to investigate, both from a scientific and public policy
perspective, the extent to which an increase in maternal income during pregnancy impacts
infant health. The issue, however, is complicated because of the endogeneity of income. For
example, in the analysis of the impact of mother’s income on birth outcomes, it is difficult to
find exogenous variations in income that could help identify the causal impact of income on
birth weight. Consequently, one line of research has focused on aggregate units such as the
rate of low birth weight infants at the state level, and analyzed how this aggregate is impacted
by state unemployment rates. For example, Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004) found that
higher unemployment rates were associated with improved health outcomes of infants as
measured by the prevalence of the rate of low birth weight. This result is consistent with the
findings of Ruhm (2000), who found that health behaviors improved during bad economic
times, leading to improved health outcomes. In the context of birth weight, there are two
channels through which earnings may affect birth weight. First, if child health is a normal
good, then an increase in income increases the derived demand for health inputs. Mothers
may increase the consumption of prenatal care, and they may initiate prenatal medical care
earlier during the pregnancy. In this case, increases in prenatal care consumption will lead
to increases in birth weight. On the other hand, prenatal care is a time intensive activity
and an increase in the opportunity cost of time may result in mothers seeking less prenatal
1As described in Almond and Currie (2011), different approached to health production exist; e.g. Heckman
(2007)
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care. Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004) show that the average number of prenatal care visits
by pregnant women increases during times of high unemployment and they argue that the
decline in the opportunity cost of time during recessions (when incomes go down) is the
underlying reason for this decline. They report that a one percentage point increase in the
unemployment rate results in a 0.26-0.5 percent reduction in the prevalence of low birth
weight rate, and they attribute the improvement of birth outcomes to the implied increase
of prenatal care consumption. However, as pointed out by Lindo (2011), Dehejia and Lleras-
Muney (2004) are not able to isolate the impact of income on infant health from the impact
of other factors that are associated with periods of high unemployment.
Almond et al. (2011) explained the county-level average birth weight as a function of
the introduction of the Food Stamp Program (FSP) in the 1960s. Exploiting the fact that
the FSP became operational in different counties in different time periods, they find that
FSP had a positive impact on birth weight, with larger impacts among African American
mothers. Although food stamps can be used only to purchase certain food items, Hoynes
and Schanzenbach (2009) report that the food stamp recipients behave as if the benefits were
paid in cash, suggesting that the receipt of food stamps is equivalent to an income transfer.
On the other hand, Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012) find that the food stamp program
leads to reductions in employment and hours worked, especially among families headed by
single women. They show that the impact on the treated is 500-600 fewer hours of work per
year. This suggests that the increase in disposable income due to the food stamp receipt is
counterbalanced to some extent by a decline in labor supply triggered by the food stamp
program, and therefore the net effect on household income may be not substantial.
Hoynes et al. (2012) use changes in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) policy to
identify exogenous changes in income. They use birth certificate data collapsed into cells
defined by state, month, parity of birth, education, marital status, race, and age of the
mother to identify the amount of EITC for which the family is eligible. Using a difference in
difference specification to capture the effect of an expansion of the EITC in 1993, the authors
conclude that increases in EITC income result in a lower incidence of low birth weight as
well as an increase in mean birth weight.
An alternative strategy to investigate the impact of income on infant health involves
using micro data, and finding arguably exogenous variations in income. One such example
is Lindo (2011) where the job loss of a husband in the past is used as an exogenous shock to
household income. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and controlling for
individual fixed effects, the paper found that a husband’s job loss in the past has a strong
egative effect on infant health, reducing birth weight by about 4.5 percent. Although this
is an interesting result, the magnitude of the decline in income due to job loss is unknown,
so is the extent to which job loss is correlated with stress in the household, which can also
have a detrimental effect on birth outcomes. Along the same lines, Chung and Kim (2012)
used payouts of dividends from the Alaska Permanent Fund during the 1980s as a source of
exogenous variation in family income and found a very small positive effect of family income
on birth weight. The magnitude of the effect was very small: about 14 grams of additional
birth weight per one thousand dollars of additional income.
In this paper I employ data from the United States Detail Natality files for the period of
1978 to 2004 and use information on nearly 85 million births to estimate the causal impact
of mothers’ earnings at the time of conception on the birth weight of the newborns using
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an instrumental-variables strategy. Because earnings of pregnant women may be correlated
with unobserved attributes that may also impact birth outcomes, I use state level skill-biased
technology as an instrument for earnings. As earnings information is not available on birth
certificates, I use micro data from the CPS for the same time period to estimate first-stage
earnings equations. The reduced form equations are based on birth certificates where birth
weight of the newborn depends on exogenous mother characteristics and the state-level skill-
biased technology parameter. This two-sample instrumental variables design enables us to
recover the structural estimate of the impact of mothers’ earnings on birth weight.
In addition, I estimate input demand functions for smoking, drinking, and prenatal med-
ical care using data provided by birth certificates. Together, these results reveal insights
into not only the impact of income on birth weight, but also on the pathways through which
the impact of income operates. For example, I find that in case of low-skill pregnant women
(those with education levels of high school or less) the increase in income produces an increase
in prenatal care. On the other hand, the same increase in income prompts these mothers to
smoke and drink more. The net result is an improvement in birth weight as the detrimental
impact of incremental smoking and drinking are outweighed by the benefit of additional pre-
natal care consumption. A different result is obtained for high-skill married mothers. They
too increase their demand for smoking and drinking as well as prenatal care consumption
(both in terms of the number of visit and early initiation). The net effect of these changes on
birth weight, however, is negative in case of high-skill married mothers (those with at least
some college education). Such heterogeneity has not been detected before in the literature.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section I describe the empirical
framework and introduce the instrument. Section 3.4 describes the data, and Section 3.5
presents the results. Section 3.6 is the conclusion.
3.2 Theoretical Framework and Empirical Strategy
Following the standard framework of a birth weight production function as outlined in Gross-
man and Joyce (1990), Corman et al. (1987), and Corman and Grossman (1985), I assume
that parents’ utility function depends on consumption, the number of births, and the birth
outcome. Maximization of this function subject to production and budget constraints gener-
ates the demand for birth outcome; and the production function of birth outcome determines
the demand for inputs such as medical care. The birth weight production function can be
depicted as
b = f(m, a, z) (3.1)
where m is the use of prenatal care, a is the use of contraceptive and abortion services, and
z represents maternal risk factors and productive efficiency of the mother (Altindag et al.,
2011; Grossman, 2006, 2000). Input demand functions are given by Equations (3.2) and
(3.3).
m = g1(p, y, z) (3.2)
a = g2(p, y, z) (3.3)
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where p is the vector of prices and availability and y represents income. Substitution of 3.2
into 3.1 yields
b = h(p, y, z) (3.4)
Equation 3.2 is the reduced form demand function for the birth outcome, where birth
outcome b depends on prices, income and maternal risk factors. I estimate 3.2 to identify
the impact of income on infant health at the mother level. I also estimate 3.2 to identify
the role played by income in inputs demand functions. The input demand functions are also
reduced form equations because they are obtained by maximizing a utility function subject
to production and resource constraints (Corman and Grossman, 1985).
Although 3.2 is a reduced form, its estimation is complicated using micro data (birth
certificates) for two reasons. First, the birth certificate data do not contain information on
mother’s income (y). Second, even if income information were available on birth certificates,
mother’s income (or family income) in equation 3.2 is likely endogenous if more productive
mothers with higher incomes have better health outcomes due to unobservable productivity.
Therefore I develop an instrument for y to employ in equations 3.2 and 3.2. The details of
the instrument are described below.
Since a data set that includes both income and indicators of infant health are not avail-
able, I employ data from two different sources and use a two-sample instrumental variables
strategy. I use income data for women of child bearing age from the Current Population
Survey (CPS) for the years 1978-2004 to estimate the following first stage regression.







whereEarningstis represents real weekly earnings of woman i in state s in year t, and X tis
stands for a vector of individual level characteristics. It also includes state fixed effects, year
fixed- effects and state-specific time trends. Note that equation 3.5 does not represent a
panel data structure. Instead, it depicts the models to be estimated based on repeated cross
sections using the CPS data, and the superscript t indicates the year of the CPS survey.
As will be detailed below, skill-biased technological change in year t and state s negatively
affects earnings of unskilled women (women with high school education or less). On the other
hand, earnings increase in response to skill-biased technological change for skilled women
(women with at least some college education). This means that in the sample of unskilled
(skilled) mothers, β1 is expected to be negative (positive).
I estimate Equation 3.5 separately by skill (high and low) and marital status (married
and unmarried) by dividing the sample of CPS women into four mutually exclusive groups.
X includes race indicators and the age of the woman. The first two sub-samples contain
low-skill married and low-skill unmarried women. These women have at most a high school
education. Therefore in these samples I include a dummy variable to control for whether the
woman has a high school degree. The remaining two sub-samples contain married high-skill
women and unmarried high-skill women. In these samples I add an indicator to control for
the receipt of a college diploma.
The second data set pertains to nearly 85 million of birth certificates in the United States
for the years 1978-2004. These data are employed to estimate the reduced form equation 3.6
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where Outcometis stands for the birth weight of the child, the extent of prenatal care con-
sumption during pregnancy, or smoking/drinking behavior of mother who gave birth in state
s during year t. Note that the explanatory variables X are identical in both the reduced
form and first stage equations 3.5 and 3.6 for the two-sample instrumental variable strategy
to be viable (Inoue and Solon, 2010).
Taking the ratio of the coefficient of the instrument from the reduced form estimates
using birth certificate data (α1 in Equation (3.6), and the coefficient of the instrument from
the first stage estimation using CPS data (β2 in Equation (3.5)) provides the two-sample
instrumental variables estimate of the impact of earnings on birth outcomes. That is, I
calculate γ = α1
β1
. I use the delta method to calculate the standard error of the estimate of
γ (Inoue and Solon, 2010; Dee and Evans, 2003). Specifically, the variance of the estimated


































and because I use the actual population of birth certificates (nearly 85 million records),
rather than a sample in estimation β1 from the first-stage regession (3.5), I take var(β1) = 0





The two-sample instrumental variables approach was pioneered by Angrist and Krueger
(1992), who used the two stage instrumental variables estimator to estimate the effect of age
at school entry on educational attainment. Other applications of this estimator can be found
in Lindo and Stoecker (2010) who investigated the criminal propensity of Vietnam veterans,
Dee and Evans (2003) who examined the impact of drinking on the educational attainment
of teenagers, as well as Currie and Yelowitz (2000) who analyzed the impact of housing
project on the welfare of children. For a succinct technical discussion of the estimator see
Inoue and Solon (2010).
3.3 The Instrument
I use a measure of state- and year-specific skill-biased technological change as an instrument
for mothers’ earnings. Let aggregate output, Yst, produced in state s during year t be
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described by the following CES production function where H and L stand for efficiency-








AH and AL are factor-augmenting technology terms. The parameter σ is the elasticity of
substitution between low-skilled and high-skilled labor and based on previous work, it is
assumed to be greater than one. Following Autor et al. (2008) we set σ = 1.6. Assuming
competitive factor markets, the first order conditions result in the following relationship
between the relative wage of skilled and unskilled worked, WHst/WLst, and the relative















where WH and WL represent efficient-adjusted wages of skilled and unskilled labor, respec-
tively. Using data on wages and labor supply of both low-skilled and high-skilled labor for
the CPS, I back out the value of AHst/ALst. Following Autor et al. (1998), Autor et al.
(2008), and Goldin and Katz (2007), I use ln (AHst/ALst) as an index for skill-biased tech-
nological change. I use this index of skill-biased technological change as an instrument for
mothers’ earnings. Although a change in ln (AHst/ALst) can arise for a number of reasons,
ranging from variations in the relative prices of non-labor inputs to the evolution of labor
market institutions, the consensus in the literature is that the primary driver of ln(AH/AL)
is skill-biased technological change (Autor et al., 2008; Goldin and Katz, 2007).
A related point is whether skill-biased technological change and the resultant change
in the relative demand for skilled workers would induce a policy reaction, which would
render our instrument invalid. For example, if state governments increase minimum wages
in reaction to a change in technology favoring skilled workers, the instrument would be invalid
to the extent that the minimum wage has a direct impact on infant health. However, the
scenario that states increase the level of minimum wages in response to technology shocks
does not seem realistic because minimum wages are not adjusted frequently. Mocan and
Unel (2011) provide detailed evidence on the validity of this instrument. The construction
of the instrument using the CPS data is explained in the Appendix to this chapter.
3.4 Data
I use individual-level data from two sources. First, I use birth certificates of the universe
of births in the United States for the years 1978-2004, obtained from the Natality Detail
Files of the National Center for Health Statistics. The birth certificate data contain a record
for each child born in the United States, and each record includes information regarding
the child’s birth weight, as well as demographic characteristics of the mother, such as age,
education, race, and marital status.2 In addition, information regarding the mother’s use of
2I make use of the frequency weights supplied with the data for the years 1978-1984 because some states
did not report 100 percent of births during that time period. Using the frequency weights allows us to
expand the data set in order to accurately account for all births in the US. Hawaii, Mississippi, New Jersey,
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prenatal care and the mother’s smoking and drinking behavior are available. I use only birth
certificates for singleton births to mothers who are at least 18 years old, and I use data only
until 2004 because geographic identifiers are not available in the public use data starting in
2005. Geographic identifiers -in particular the state of residence of mothers– are essential in
order to be able to match our measure of state-level skill-biased technology shocks described
above with individual mothers in the data set.
Demographic information for the mother, such as her age, race, education, and marital
status, is generally available on the birth certificates, with a few exceptions. Some states
did not report education in all years. Specifically, New Mexico did not report education
in the years 1978 and 1979; California and Texas did not report mothers’ education in the
years 1979-1988, and Washington did not start reporting education until 1992. Furthermore,
not all states reported the marital status of mothers in all years. California, Connecticut,
Georgia, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, and Texas did not
report the marital status of mothers in 1978 and 1979.
I use the birth weight of the infants (recorded in grams) from the birth certificates
as a measure of infant health. Since one potential mechanism for how income can affect
infant health is prenatal care, I make use of several measures of prenatal care consumption
contained in the birth certificates. There are two particular variables of interest: The number
of prenatal care visits attended by the mother, and the month of the pregnancy during which
prenatal care was initiated. The number of prenatal care visits is the actual number of times
that the mother visited a physician for prenatal consultations. The month of the pregnancy
when the first prenatal care visit took place is an indication for how early the mother sought
prenatal care. 3 Since it is important that prenatal care starts early in the pregnancy I also
create a dummy variable that indicates whether prenatal care was initiated late. I consider
prenatal care to have commenced late if the first prenatal care visits occurred after the first
trimester of the pregnancy, i.e. if prenatal care was initiated in the fourth month of the
pregnancy or thereafter.
Regarding smoking and drinking, data are generally available starting in 1989. Smoking
behavior is recorded using a dummy variable indicating whether the mother smoked during
the pregnancy, and drinking behavior is similarly captured using a dummy variable indicating
whether the mother consumed alcohol during the pregnancy. While most states started
reporting smoking and drinking information in 1989, some states started reporting this
information later. Louisiana and Nebraska started reporting smoking and drinking behavior
information in1990, Oklahoma started in 1991, New York in 1995, and Indiana in 1999.
California and South Dakota never reported data on smoking or drinking.4
After restricting the birth certificate data to records of only singleton births to mothers
age 18-49 where demographic information of the mother is available, I end up with a data
Pennsylvania, and Wyoming started reporting 100 percent of births in 1979; Arkansas and South Dakota
in 1980; New Mexico in 1982; North Dakota in 1983; Arizona, California, Delaware, Washington DC, and
Georgia in 1985. All states were reporting 100 percent of births starting in 1985.
3If no prenatal care took place, then the month of the first prenatal care visit is coded to be equal to 10.
4Beginning in 2003, some states adopted a revised version of the standard birth certificate that changed
the way in which smoking behavior of the mother are recorded. Specifically, the revised version contains
smoking participation information separately for each trimester of the pregnancy. In those cases I recode
data on the different trimesters to be consistent with the measure of smoking used during the other years.
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set of 84,967,027 birth certificates. I merge these birth certificates with the measure of skill-
biased technological change described in Section 3.3 using the year of conception and the
state of residence of the mother.
In our two-sample design, I combine information from the birth certificates regarding
the circumstances of each birth with information regarding mothers’ earnings. I obtain
individual-level earnings data from the Current Population Survey’s Annual Demographic
File. Since the birth certificate data are for mothers of age 18-49, I only use the earnings
for females who are between 18 and 49 years old in the CPS data. The CPS contains an
income measure indicating annual personal income from wages and salaries for the calendar
year prior to the survey. I construct the measure of real weekly earnings by dividing the real
value (in 2005 Dollars) of annual personal income from wages and salaries in the previous
calendar year by the number of weeks worked in the previous calendar year.5 For women in
the CPS sample, the year during which the reported income was earned is therefore the year
prior to the CPS survey year.
After restricting the CPS sample to women between the ages of 18 and 49, and dropping
observations with missing demographic information, the resulting data set contains 537,274
observations. I merge these observations with the measure of skill-biased technological change
described in Section 3 using the year during which income was earned and the state of
residence of the woman.
In order to match the time of conception of infants with the time when personal income
was earned by the mother, we subtract nine months from the date of birth of infants from
the birth certificates and match the resulting year with the year during which income was
earned by women in the CPS sample. 6 For example, if a child was born in November of
2000, then conception occurred in February of 2000. Real weekly earnings during February
of 2000 are then obtained from the 2001 survey year of the CPS sample.
As described earlier, I use the state of residence of the mother to match skill-biased
technology shocks with births. Therefore, there are some births in the data that occurred
in a state other than the state of residence of the mother. For example, while a mother
may be a resident of California, she may have given birth in Illinois. In this case, the birth
certificate would be reported by the state of Illinois and will include all items reported by
the state of Illinois. Some items reported by Illinois may, however, not be reported by the
state of California. For example, smoking information is never reported by California, but
is included in the Illinois birth certificate data starting in 1989. In order to check whether
women who give birth in states other than their state of residence significantly influence the
results, I also estimated specifications that include only mothers who gave birth in the state
where they reside. The results did not change.
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics of the birth weight data and the CPS income
data. The instrument (the measure of skill biased technology change described above) is
available in both the birth weight data from birth certificates and the income data from
the CPS. Summary statistics of the instrument are very similar between the two data sets.
Average real weekly earnings for women in the CPS sample are $592.43. Infants have an
5I exclude women who were employed less than full time in the previous calendar year, and also exclude
women who are self-employed.
6In our main results I assume that a pregnancy lasts nine months because gestational length is often
missing on the birth certificates, and it is measured with error.
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average birth weight of about 3,362 grams and mothers attend on average 11 prenatal care
visits during the course of their pregnancies. Since the mean of the month of pregnancy
when prenatal care began is about 2.7, women do on average initiate prenatal care in the
first trimester. In fact only 18 percent of women initiate prenatal care late, i.e. in the fourth
month of their pregnancy or later. There are some important differences in the average
characteristics of women in the CPS Samples compared to the characteristics of mothers
obtained from the birth certificates. In terms of age, women in the CPS sample tend to be
older on average, though the minimum age is 18 and the maximum age is 49 in both samples.
In terms of education, the characteristics of women in the CPS sample are very similar to the
characteristics of mothers from the birth certificates. In both samples, about 38 percent of
women have a high school diploma. However, the proportion of women with less than a high
school education is larger in the birth certificate data (18.9 percent) compared to the CPS
sample (9.7 percent). At the same time, women in the CPS sample are more likely to have
some college education, or a college degree compared to the mothers in the birth certificate
data. Racial characteristics are very similar between the two data sources, although the
proportion of black mothers from birth certificates (15.2 percent) is slightly higher than the
proportion of black women in the CPS sample (11.8 percent). Regarding marital status, 74
percent of mothers in the birth certificate data are married, while only 56 percent of women
in the CPS sample are married.
Since our empirical strategy described above relies on estimating the impact of earnings
on mothers’ behavior and the impact of earnings on health outcomes of newborns separately
for low-skill mothers and high-skill mothers, I present summary statistics separately for low-
skill mothers (Table 2) and for high-skill mothers (Table 3). I assign the skill level of women
by using information about their educational attainment. I classify women as being low-
skilled if they have at most a high school diploma. Women are considered high-skilled if
they have at least some college education.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show that the average birth weight for children of low-skill mothers
(3,318 grams) is less than the average birth weight of children of high-skill mothers (3,421
grams). This is a difference of 103 grams, or about 3.6 ounces. The tables also show that
the number of prenatal care visits of low-skill mothers is significantly lower than the average
number of prenatal care visits for high-skill mothers. Moreover, low-skill mothers initiate
prenatal care later than high-skill mothers and the percentage of low-skill mothers who
smoked during their pregnancy (20.7 percent) is much higher compared to the percentage of
high-skill mothers who smoked during their pregnancy (6.4 percent).
3.5 Results
Table 3.4 presents the results pertaining to low-skilled married women. I report the results
for the birth weight equation, for smoking and drinking as well as three measures of prenatal
care. Smoking and drinking are dummy variables to indicate if the mother smoked cigarettes
or consumed alcohol during pregnancy. Prenatal Care Late is another dummy variable that
takes the value of one if the prenatal care was initiated after the first trimester during
pregnancy. Prenatal Care Visits is the number of visits to a prenatal care provider during
the pregnancy. Prenatal Care Delay represents the delay in the receipt of prenatal care
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Current Population Survey (CPS) and Birth Certificate Data
CPS Sample Birth Certificates
Variable Mean Standard Observations Mean Standard Observations
Deviation Deviation
Ln(As/Au) 0.8020 0.8022 537,274 0.7974 0.8178 84,967,027
Real Weekly Earnings (2005 Dollars) 592.43 424.03 537,274 - -
Birth Weight (grams) - - 3362.1 576.89 84,967,027
Number of Prenatal Care Visits - - 11.22 3.937 82,589,996
Prenatal Care Delay† - - 2.693 1.682 83,217,094
Late Initiation of Prenatal Care (after 1st Trimester)‡ - - 0.1822 0.3861 82,148,495
Smoking (=1 if smoked during pregnancy) - - 0.1403 0.3473 46,341,011
Drinking (=1 if drank alcohol during pregnancy) - - 0.0167 0.1281 47,019,239
Age 33.83 8.563 537,274 26.94 5.554 84,967,027
Less than High School Education 0.0967 0.2955 537,274 0.1892 0.3917 84,967,027
High School Diploma 0.3812 0.4857 537,274 0.3821 0.4859 84,967,027
Some College Education 0.2708 0.4444 537,274 0.2185 0.4132 84,967,027
College Graduate 0.2512 0.4337 537,274 0.2102 0.4074 84,967,027
White 0.8318 0.3741 537,274 0.8015 0.3989 84,967,027
Black 0.1184 0.3231 537,274 0.1523 0.3593 84,967,027
Other Race 0.0498 0.2176 537,274 0.0462 0.2099 84,967,027
Married 0.5566 0.4968 537,274 0.7384 0.4395 84,028,062
Note: Borth the CPS Sample and Birth Certificates are for the years 1978-2004. Smoking is available starting in 1989
† If no prenatal care took place, prenatal care delay is coded = 10
‡ Late initiation of prenatal care is conditional on having any prenatal care.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for Low-Skill Women of Current Population Survey (CPS) and Birth Certificate Data
CPS Sample Birth Certificates
Variable Mean Standard Observations Mean Standard Observations
Deviation Deviation
Ln(As/Au) 0.6502 0.8146 256,778 0.7249 0.8342 48,542,162
Real Weekly Earnings (2005 Dollars) 458.41 286.33 256,778 - -
Birth Weight (grams) - - 3317.74 586.02 48,542,162
Number of Prenatal Care Visits - - 10.67 4.126 46,983,504
Prenatal Care Delay† - - 2.995 1.870 47,385,277
Late Initiation of Prenatal Care (after 1st Trimester)‡ - - 0.2454 0.4303 46,478,298
Smoking (=1 if smoked during pregnancy) - - 0.2069 0.4051 24,735,925
Drinking (=1 if drank alcohol during pregnancy) - - 0.0182 0.1335 25,146,296
Age 33.52 8.929 256,778 25.25 5.368 48,542,162
Less than High School Education 0.2024 0.4017 256,778 0.3312 0.4706 48,542,162
High School Diploma 0.7977 0.4017 256,778 0.6688 0.4706 48,542,162
White 0.8286 0.3768 256,778 0.7801 0.4142 48,542,162
Black 0.1292 0.3354 256,778 0.1811 0.3851 48,542,162
Other Race 0.0422 0.2009 256,778 0.0388 0.1931 48,542,162
Married 0.5609 0.4963 256,778 0.6379 0.4806 47,907,785
Note: Borth the CPS Sample and Birth Certificates are for the years 1978-2004. Smoking is available starting in 1989
Low-skill means that the mother has a high school diploma or less education
† If no prenatal care took place, prenatal care delay is coded = 10
‡ Late initiation of prenatal care is conditional on having any prenatal care.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics for High-Skill Women of Current Population Survey (CPS) and Birth Certificate Data
CPS Sample Birth Certificates
Variable Mean Standard Observations Mean Standard Observations
Deviation Deviation
Ln(As/Au) 0.9409 0.7647 280,496 0.8941 0.7851 36,424,865
Real Weekly Earnings (2005 Dollars) 715.11 487.70 280,496 - -
Birth Weight (grams) - - 3421.28 559.04 36,424,865
Number of Prenatal Care Visits - - 11.94 3.54 35,606,492
Prenatal Care Delay† - - 2.2959 1.2903 35,831,817
Late Initiation of Prenatal Care (after 1st Trimester)‡ - - 0.1000 0.3001 35,670,197
Smoking (=1 if smoked during pregnancy) - - 0.0641 0.2450 21,605,086
Drinking (=1 if drank alcohol during pregnancy) - - 0.0150 0.1215 21,872,943
Age 34.11 8.20 280,496 29.19 4.971 36,424,865
Some College Education 0.5188 0.4997 280,496 0.5097 0.4999 36,424,865
College Graduate 0.4812 0.4997 280,496 0.4903 0.4999 36,424,865
White 0.8346 0.3715 280,496 0.8301 0.3756 36,424,865
Black 0.1085 0.3110 280,496 0.1139 0.3177 36,424,865
Other Race 0.0569 0.2316 280,496 0.0560 0.2299 36,424,865
Married 0.5526 0.4972 280,496 0.8718 0.3343 36,120,277
Note: Borth the CPS Sample and Birth Certificates are for the years 1978-2004. Smoking is available starting in 1989
High-skill means that the mother has at least some college education
† If no prenatal care took place, prenatal care delay is coded = 10
‡ Late initiation of prenatal care is conditional on having any prenatal care.
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Table 3.4: Results for Low-Skill, Married Women
Low-Skill, Married Women
First Stage Reduced Form IV
Birth Weight (grams) -0.0312∗∗∗ -0.2330 7.4796∗∗∗
(0.0069) (1.6481)
Prenatal Care Visits -0.0312∗∗∗ -0.0708 2.2716∗∗∗
(0.0069) (-0.5005)
Prenatal Care Delay -0.0312∗∗∗ 0.0365 -1.1697∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.2577)
Prenatal Care Late -0.0312∗∗∗ 0.0066 -0.2110∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0465)
Smoking -0.0375∗∗∗ -0.0004 0.0098∗∗∗
(0.0101) (0.0026)
Drinking -0.0393∗∗∗ -0.0001 0.0015∗∗∗
(0.0101) (0.0004)
Notes: Sample sizes in the first stage are about 144,000 for the birth weight
equation and the prenatal care equations, and about 80,000 for the smoking
and drinking equations. The reduced form uses about 30,000,000 observa-
tions for birth weight and prenatal care equations, and about 14,000,000
observations for smoking and drinking equations. First stage results were
obtained using data from the Annual Demographic File of the Current pop-
ulation survey for the years 1978-2004 (birth weight and prenatal care equa-
tions) and for the years 1989-2004 (smoking and drinking equations). Re-
gressions also include a quadratic term in age, controls for having a high
school diploma, race, state dummies, year dummies, and state-specific year
trends. The F-Statistic of the first stage is 150.98 for birth weight and
prenatal care equations, 98.79 for the smoking equation, and 99.86 for the
drinking equation. The reduced form results were obtained using the birth
certificate data for the years 1978-2004 and regressions include identical con-
trol variables as the first stage regressions. I do not report standard errors
for the reduced form because I use the population of births to low-skill mar-
ried women. The IV estimate is the ratio of the reduced form coefficient
over the first stage coefficient. Prenatal Care Visits are the number of times
the mother visited a health care provider for prenatal consultations dur-
ing the pregnancy. Prenatal Care Delay is the number of months that the
mother waited before seeking prenatal care. Prenatal Care Late is a dummy
variable indicating whether the mother initiated prenatal care after the first
trimester of the pregnancy. Smoking is a dummy variable for whether the
mother smoked in during the pregnancy. Drinking is a dummy variable for
whether the mother drank during the pregnancy.
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in months. For example, if the mother started receiving prenatal care in the fifth month of
her pregnancy, this variable takes the value of five. If she never received prenatal care, the
variable is assigned the value of 10.
The first row of Table 3.4 shows that the first-stage, the reduced form and the IV esti-
mates. The instrument is very strong with F-values obtained from the first stage are in the
range of 99-150. The birth weight is in levels, and the real weekly earnings are in logarithms.
Thus, the IV estimate indicates that a 10 percent increase in mother’s real weekly earnings
increases the birth weight of children of unskilled married women by only 0.7 grams, which
is a very small impact. The table shows that an increase in income has a positive effect
on prenatal care consumption. Specifically, an increase in real weekly earnings has a small
impact on the number or prenatal care visits during pregnancy, and the same increase in
income generates a shortening in the delay of the initiation of prenatal care (i.e. women start
consuming prenatal care sooner after getting pregnant). Consistent with these results, I also
observe that an increase in income of low-skilled married women reduces their propensity to
initiate late prenatal care (after the first trimester).
Table 3.4 also shows that cigarettes and alcohol are normal goods for low-skilled married
women. The propensity to drink and smoke during pregnancy goes up for these women as
their weekly earnings go up.7 The upshot of Table 3.4 is that in case of low-skilled married
mothers, an increase in income, triggered by a state-level shock to the relative demand for
skilled labor, increases the propensity to consume of alcohol and cigarettes, and it increases
the consumption of prenatal care. The net result is a negligible positive impact on birth
weight.
Table 3.5 displays a different picture in case of high-skilled married women. In this
case, an increase in real weekly earnings prompts an increase the propensity to consume
alcohol and cigarettes. Put differently, alcohol and cigarettes are normal goods for high-skill
married women as was the case with low-skilled married women. However, the increase in
income produces a decrease in prenatal care consumption for high-skilled married women:
the number of prenatal visits goes down, and the propensity to delay the initiation of prenatal
care goes up. This decline in prenatal medical care use is consistent with that reported by
Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004) and it could be because of increased opportunity cost of
7While there exist an extensive literature on the effect of cigarette prices on smoking (Tekin et al., 2009;
Cawley et al., 2004; Colman et al., 2003; Becker et al., 1994), the evidence on the income elasticity of
smoking is scant. Maternal smoking behavior has also received attention (Fingerhut et al., 1990). However,
the focus of the research has again been the effect of price changes on smoking behavior of women, not on
income (Evans and Ringel, 1999; Evans et al., 1999; Ringel and Evans, 2001). For example Ringel and Evans
(2001) investigate how women’s smoking behavior during pregnancy is affected by cigarette taxes and find
that higher cigarette taxes reduce smoking rates among pregnant women. They find that the quit behavior
of pregnant women is more sensitive to changes in the prices of cigarettes than the quit behavior of non-
pregnant women. The authors acknowledge that income is an essential control variable, but they are unable
to control for it using only data from the Natality Detail Files. Limited evidence on the income elasticity
of smoking suggests that whether income elasticity is positive or negative varies systematically across time
periods, countries, and demographic groups. For high-income countries like the U.S. the sign appears to
have reversed over time, so that cigarettes appear to have switched from being a normal good to an inferior
good (Cheng and Kenkel, 2010; Wasserman et al., 1991). Kenkel et al. (2011) use data on 7 waves of the
Current Population Survey’s Tobacco Use Supplement matched with income data from the Annual Social
and Economic Supplement from 1993 to 2007. The authors find that while the income elasticity of smoking
in a cross sectional OLS specification is positive, that income elasticity is negative in the IV specification.
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time for these high-educated mothers. The end result is a small decline in birth weight.
Specifically, a 10 percent increase in income generates about 0.4 grams decline in birth
weight.
Although the magnitude of the impact of income is negligible for both low-skilled and
high-skilled married women, one interesting implication of the results is that prenatal care
consumption counterbalances the harmful effect of cigarette and alcohol consumption during
pregnancy. Both low-skilled and high-skilled married mothers’ propensity to smoke and
consume alcohol goes up in reaction to a change in their income. High-skilled married
mothers decrease their prenatal care consumption when their income rises, which further
jeopardizes their birth outcomes. The end result is a decrease, albeit small, in birth weight.
Low-skilled married mothers, on the other hand, increase their prenatal care consumption
and the beneficial effect of prenatal care outweighs the detrimental effect of cigarettes and
alcohols, producing a small increase in birth weight.
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 present the results pertaining to low-skilled and high-skilled unmarried
women, respectively. In these samples the impact of income on birth weight is still small,
although it is larger than those obtained from the sample of married women. As before, the
direction of the impact is different between low-skilled and high-skilled women. For example,
Table 3.6 shows that a 10 percent increase in real weekly earnings reduces birth weight of
newborns of low-skilled unmarried women by 3 grams. Table 3.7 demonstrates that the same
increase in earnings increases the birth weight of babies of high-skilled unmarried mothers
by about 5 grams.
The small and negative impact on birth weight of an increase in income in the sample
of low-skilled unmarried women emerges because the detrimental impact of the rise in the
propensity to drink and smoke as a result of an increase in income is evidently greater than
the beneficial effect of increased prenatal care. This is in contrast to the case of low-skilled
married women, for whom the birth outcomes improve despite the changes in prenatal care
and alcohol and cigarette consumption in the same direction.
Unmarried, high-skilled mothers present a different picture. For this group, alcohol and
cigarettes are inferior goods, thus the propensity to drink and smoke goes down as income
goes up. However, so does the consumption of prenatal care, presumably because the op-
portunity cost of time is higher. The net result is a positive but small effect on birth weight.
Grossman and Joyce (1990) find a small impact of prenatal care on birth weight. Specif-
ically, they report that a month of prenatal care delay causes a reduction of in birth weight
by 37 grams for black mothers, and it has not statistically significant effect in case of white
mothers. This finding collaborates with results. I find that mother’s income has a small
impact on the use of prenatal medical care. Given that prenatal care has a small impact on
birth weight reported by Grossman and Joyce (1990), the impact of income on birth weight
through the channel of prenatal care is expected to be low.
Previous research has shown a detrimental impact of smoking while pregnant on birth
weight. Much of this research is based on the intensity of maternal smoking; i.e. the number
of cigarettes smoked during pregnancy (e.g. Grossman and Joyce (1990); Rosenzweig and
Schultz (1983)), although the inference obtained from Evans and Ringel (1999) is based on
smoking participation during pregnancy as I do in this paper. Researchers either considered
cigarette consumption as an exogenous variable, or investigated the impact of cigarettes on
birth weight driven by changes in cigarette prices. Information on the response of maternal
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Table 3.5: Results for High-Skill, Married Women
Low-Skill, Married Women
First Stage Reduced Form IV
Birth Weight (grams) 0.0239∗∗∗ -0.0915 -3.8359∗∗∗
(0.0068) (1.0967)
Prenatal Care Visits 0.0239∗∗∗ -0.0360 -1.5099∗∗∗
(0.0068) (0.4317)
Prenatal Care Delay 0.0239∗∗∗ 0.0181 0.7582∗∗∗
(0.0068) (0.2168)
Prenatal Care Late 0.0239∗∗∗ 0.0031 0.1313∗∗∗
(0.0068) (0.0375)
Smoking 0.0179∗∗ 0.0017 0.0927∗∗
(0.0087) (0.0448)
Drinking 0.0172∗∗ 0.0008 0.0474∗∗
(0.0087) (0.0239)
Notes: Sample sizes in the first stage are about 155,000 for the birth weight
equation and the prenatal care equations, and about 111,000 for the smok-
ing and drinking equations. The reduced form uses about 31,000,000 obser-
vations for birth weight and prenatal care equations, and about 19,000,000
observations for smoking and drinking equations. First stage results were
obtained using data from the Annual Demographic File of the Current pop-
ulation survey for the years 1978- 2004 (birth weight and prenatal care
equations) and for the years 1989-2004 (smoking and drinking equations).
Regressions also include a quadratic term in age, controls for having a high
school diploma, race, state dummies, year dummies, and state-specific year
trends. The F-Statistic of the first stage is 332.64 for birth weight and pre-
natal care equations, 257.72 for the smoking equation, and 260.5 for the
drinking equation. The reduced form results were obtained using the birth
certificate data for the years 1978-2004 and regressions include identical con-
trol variables as the first stage regressions. I do not report standard errors
for the reduced form because I use the population of births to skilled mar-
ried women. The IV estimate is the ratio of the reduced form coefficient
over the first stage coefficient. Prenatal Care Visits are the number of times
the mother visited a health care provider for prenatal consultations dur-
ing the pregnancy. Prenatal Care Delay is the number of months that the
mother waited before seeking prenatal care. Prenatal Care Late is a dummy
variable indicating whether the mother initiated prenatal care after the first
trimester of the pregnancy. Smoking is a dummy variable for whether the
mother smoked in during the pregnancy. Drinking is a dummy variable for
whether the mother drank during the pregnancy.
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Table 3.6: Results for Low-Skill, Unmarried Women
Low-Skill, Married Women
First Stage Reduced Form IV
Birth Weight (grams) -0.0320∗∗∗ 0.9968 -31.1758∗∗∗
(0.0080) (7.8073)
Prenatal Care Visits -0.0320∗∗∗ -0.1463 4.5738∗∗∗
(0.0080) (1.1454)
Prenatal Care Delay -0.0320∗∗∗ 0.0678 -2.1207∗∗∗
(0.0080) 0.5311
Prenatal Care Late -0.0320∗∗∗ 0.0106 -0.3316∗∗∗
(0.0080) 0.0830
Smoking -0.0207∗∗ -0.0008 0.0391∗∗
(0.0116) (0.0219)
Drinking -0.0228∗∗ -0.0007 0.0289∗∗∗
(0.0116) (0.0146)
Notes: Sample sizes in the first stage are about 112,000 for the birth weight
equation and the prenatal care equations, and about 65,000 for the smoking
and drinking equations. The reduced form uses about 17,000,000 observations
for birth weight and prenatal care equations, and about 10,000,000 observa-
tions for smoking and drinking equations. First stage results were obtained
using data from the Annual Demographic File of the Current population sur-
vey for the years 1978- 2004 (birth weight and prenatal care equations) and
for the years 1989-2004 (smoking and drinking equations). Regressions also
include a quadratic term in age, controls for having a high school diploma,
race, state dummies, year dummies, and state-specific year trends. The F-
Statistic of the first stage is 186.45 for birth weight and prenatal care equa-
tions, 111.6 for the smoking equation, and 112.27 for the drinking equation.
The reduced form results were obtained using the birth certificate data for
the years 1978-2004 and regressions include identical control variables as the
first stage regressions. I do not report standard errors for the reduced form
because I use the population of births to low-skill unmarried women. The IV
estimate is the ratio of the reduced form coefficient over the first stage co-
efficient. Prenatal Care Visits are the number of times the mother visited a
health care provider for prenatal consultations during the pregnancy. Prena-
tal Care Delay is the number of months that the mother waited before seeking
prenatal care. Prenatal Care Late is a dummy variable indicating whether
the mother initiated prenatal care after the first trimester of the pregnancy.
Smoking is a dummy variable for whether the mother smoked in during the
pregnancy. Drinking is a dummy variable for whether the mother drank dur-
ing the pregnancy.
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Table 3.7: Results for High-Skill, Unmarried Women
Low-Skill, Married Women
First Stage Reduced Form IV
Birth Weight (grams) 0.0310∗∗∗ 1.5158 48.9763∗∗∗
(0.0077) (12.2424)
Prenatal Care Visits 0.0310∗∗∗ -0.1226 -3.9609∗∗∗
(0.0077) (0.9901)
Prenatal Care Delay 0.0310∗∗∗ 0.0477 1.5424∗∗∗
(0.0077) (0.3855)
Prenatal Care Late 0.0310∗∗∗ 0.0092 0.2975∗∗∗
(0.0077) (0.0744)
Smoking 0.0445∗∗∗ -0.0007 -0.0166∗∗∗
(0.0101) (0.0038)
Drinking 0.0445∗∗∗ -0.0006 -0.0138∗∗∗
(0.0101) (0.0031)
Notes: Sample sizes in the first stage are about 125,000 for the birth weight
equation and the prenatal care equations, and about 87,000 for the smok-
ing and drinking equations. The reduced form uses about 45,000,000 obser-
vations for birth weight and prenatal care equations, and about 31,000,000
observations for smoking and drinking equations. First stage results were
obtained using data from the Annual Demographic File of the Current pop-
ulation survey for the years 1978-2004 (birth weight and prenatal care equa-
tions) and for the years 1989-2004 (smoking and drinking equations). Re-
gressions also include a quadratic term in age, controls for having a high
school diploma, race, state dummies, year dummies, and state-specific year
trends. The F- Statistic of the first stage is 397.70 for birth weight and pre-
natal care equations, 302.10 for the smoking equation, and 305.28 for the
drinking equation. The reduced form results were obtained using the birth
certificate data for the years 1978-2004 and regressions include identical con-
trol variables as the first stage regressions. I do not report standard errors
for the reduced form because I use the population of births to high-skill un-
married women. The IV estimate is the ratio of the reduced form coefficient
over the first stage coefficient. Prenatal Care Visits are the number of times
the mother visited a health care provider for prenatal consultations dur-
ing the pregnancy. Prenatal Care Delay is the number of months that the
mother waited before seeking prenatal care. Prenatal Care Late is a dummy
variable indicating whether the mother initiated prenatal care after the first
trimester of the pregnancy. Smoking is a dummy variable for whether the
mother smoked in during the pregnancy. Drinking is a dummy variable for
whether the mother drank during the pregnancy.
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smoking to income is limited. Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) found that the elasticity of
maternal smoking to husband income is small, with an elasticity of 0.07. Our results also
show that smoking participation during pregnancy is small in absolute value, and therefore
a change in smoking participation (initiation or cessation of smoking during pregnancy) due
to a change in income is not an important avenue through which birth weight is impacted.
3.6 Conclusions
Although the impact of income on infant health is important to identify both from a scientific
and public policy perspective, the analysis is complicated because of the endogeneity of
income. For example, maternal income or household income is likely to be correlated with
mother attributes and household characteristics that may directly impact the birth weight
of the infant. In this paper I use a two-sample instrumental variables strategy to identify the
causal impact of mother income on the birth weight of the newborns. I use birth record data
obtained from nearly 85 million births between 1978 and 2004, which contains information
about mother characteristics, the birth weight of the newborn and the location of the birth.
Following the literature on skill-biased technological change and wage inequality, I create
a state- and year-specific measure of skill-biased technological change as an instrument in
the first-stage earnings regressions. Because earnings information is not available on birth
certificates, I use micro data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to estimate first-
stage earnings equations for women who are observationally similar to the mothers of the 85
million newborns. Specifically, the CPS women and the mothers on the birth certificates are
similar in such dimensions as state of residence, age, race, marital status and education. The
reduced form equations are based on birth certificates where the birth weight of the new-
born depends on exogenous mother characteristics and the state-level skill-biased technology
parameter. This two-sample instrumental variables design allows us recover the structural
estimate of the impact of mothers’ earnings on birth weight.
I also estimate input demand functions for smoking, drinking, and prenatal medical care
consumption of mothers using data provided by birth certificates. Together, these results
reveal insights into not only the impact of income on birth weight, but also on the pathways
through which the impact of income operates.
The results reveal significant heterogeneity between the four categories of mothers divided
by marital status (married vs. unmarried) and skill level: high-skilled (those who have at
least some college education) and low-skilled (those with an education of high school or less).
For example, an increase in real weekly earnings increases the number of prenatal medical
care visits and shortens the delay in the initiation of prenatal care for unskilled mothers,
whereas an increase in earnings has the opposite effect on prenatal care consumption of
high-skill mothers. Smoking participation and the propensity to consume alcohol go up
with income for low-skilled mothers regardless of their marital status. The consumption of
prenatal care also goes up for both of these groups. The impact on birth weight, however,
is different between low-skilled married and low-skilled unmarried mothers. The net effect
of improved medical care along with increased propensity to consume alcohol and cigarettes
among low-skilled mothers produces an improvement in birth weight for married low-skilled
mothers. On the other hand, the net effect of improved medical care and increased propensity
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to consume alcohol and cigarettes generates a decline in birth weight among unmarried low-
skilled mothers.
Although the prenatal care consumption declines as income rises for all high-skilled moth-
ers, the birth weight of infants of unmarried high-skilled mothers goes up because these
mothers’ propensity to smoke and drink goes down as their income goes up. On the other
hand, the birth weight of the newborns of unmarried low-skilled mothers goes down because
these mothers initiate drinking and smoking when income rises.
The direction of the change in birth weight as a response to a change in income is not
uniform among the groups of mothers analyzed. The impact of income on birth weight
depends on how the demand for health inputs react to a change in income, but the net effect
of income on birth weight is small.
3.7 Chapter Appendix: Construction of the Efficiency-
adjusted Labor Inputs to create the index of Skill-
biased Technological Change
I use the March Current Population Survey (CPS) files from 1978 to 2010 (covering earnings
from 1977 to 2009) for full-time workers (those who work 35 or more hours a week) ages
16 to 64. Self-employed people are dropped from the sample, as are allocated earnings
observations (using individual earnings allocation flags). In constructing the key variables,
I closely follow the previous labor literature on wage inequality (Katz and Murphy, 1992;
Krusell et al., 2000; Card and DiNardo, 2002; Autor et al., 2008).
Each individual’s average weekly earnings are formed by dividing annual income from
wages and salaries by the number of weeks worked during the previous year. Earnings are
deflated using the Personal Consumption Expenditure Index with a base year of 2005. I
make two adjustments for topcoded earnings. First, following Autor et al. (2008) income of
workers with top coded earnings is imputed by multiplying the annual topcode amount by
1.5. Second, starting in 1996, topcoded earnings values are assigned the mean of all topcoded
earners. In these cases, I simply reassign the topcoded values to all such observations and
again multiply by 1.5. Workers whose weekly earnings below $70 in 2005 dollars are dropped,
as are those non-full-year workers (i.e., those who work less than 40 weeks) whose weekly
earnings exceed 1/40th the top-coded value of weekly earnings.
I construct the series for high-skill and low-skill labor input and wages as follows. The
data in each year in each state are divided into 24 distinct groups characterized by 2 sexes, 4
education categories (Education <= 11 years, Education = 12 years, 13 <= Education <=
15 years, and Education >= 16 years) and three potential experience categories (0-9 years,
10-19 years, 20+ years). Potential experience are calculated as Min{age-years of schooling–6,
age–16} following Autor et al. (2008). In calculating each groupąŕs average weekly earnings,
earnings are weighted by the product of the corresponding CPS sampling weight and weeks
worked.
I assume that the high-skill labor class consists of college or college-plus workers and the
workers with some college; and the low-skill labor class consists of those who have no college
education. Groups within a class are assumed to be perfect substitutes and I use group
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relative weekly earnings of full-time workers as weights for the aggregation of labor inputs
into skilled and unskilled classes. Standard in this literature is the assumption that relative
wages equal relative efficiencies of labor. More specifically, following Autor et al. (2008), I
choose the group that contains male workers with less than 12 years of education and with
less than 10 years of potential experience as the base group. A relative wage measure is
then constructed by dividing each groupąŕs average weekly earnings by the average weekly
earnings of the base group. The relative efficiency index measure for each group, qg , is
computed as the arithmetic mean of the relative wage measures in that group over 1977 to









where Ngt respresents the total labor weeks used in production by group g in year t. Since
H and L are efficiency-adjusted labor inputs, the corresponding earnings Wh and WL are









where ωgt represents the average weekly earnings of group g in year t.
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Chapter 4. Food Stamps and the Time Cost
of Food Preparation∗
4.1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to investigate the cost of individuals’ time that is incurred
due to preparing food at home, with special attention paid to low income households who
receive food stamp benefits. When deciding whether or not to cook a meal at home, one
must consider not only the cost of the ingredients used to prepare the meal, but also the time
it takes to prepare the meal, serve it, as well as clean up afterwards. Since time is scarce
and costly, it is important to account for the time cost of food preparation in addition to
the direct cost of ingredients in the context of nutritional assistance program policy.
During the fiscal year 2010, over 40 million people in the United States received benefits
from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program each month (United States Department
of Agriculture, 2010). The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) provides
assistance to low-income families so they can purchase sufficient food which they might
otherwise not be able to afford. Benefits received from the program are commonly referred
to as “food stamps”; they allow the recipient to purchase food at grocery stores, produce
markets, and other stores using a debit card system that electronically deducts money spent
on groceries from the recipient’s monthly allotment. Food stamps may not be used to
purchase prepared meals in the market or non-food items also available at grocery stores1.
Therefore, when using food stamps, the recipient must necessarily incur a time cost of
preparing the food at home. If a one dollar benefit is used to buy a one dollar cheeseburger
at a fast food restaurant, then (excluding transportation costs, tipping, etc) the total benefit
will be one dollar. If, however, one dollar’s worth of ingredients to be prepared at home
are purchased at a grocery store, then the total benefit is one dollar minus the time cost of
transforming the ingredients into a meal and cleaning up afterwards.
The method of how the monthly food stamp allotments are determined as well as the
general design of the SNAP have been criticized. Recently, the failure of the program to
account for the time cost of food preparation has drawn much research interest. Specifically,
the Thrifty Food Plan (TFP), which is the basis for determining food stamp allotments,
∗This Chapter was published as “Food Stamps and the Time Cost of Food Preparation” in the Review
of Economics of the Household Volume 10, Number 2 (2012), 259–275. Reprinted here by permission of the
Review of Economics of the Household.
1The Nutritional Assistance Program of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is also administered by the
United States Department of Agriculture. This program requires 75% of a household’s benefit to be used
directly for food purchases, while up to 25% of the benefit may be withdrawn as cash. See Fraker et al.
(1986) for a discussion of the economic effects of ’cashing out’ on food stamps. The data and discussion in
this paper relate to the United States only, excluding the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
We also assume that food stamps are used for ingredients for everyday meals. While it may be possible to
purchase food items such as wedding cakes with SNAP benefits, due to the nature of the data we cannot
make distinctions between the different types of food items that SNAP participant purchase.
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has been criticized for being outdated. For example, Rose (2007) finds that the assumption
that meals are prepared using only raw ingredients purchased using food stamps contra-
dicts current U.S. welfare policy. The excessive cooking time required by recipes of the
TFP to prepare all meals from scratch discourages labor force participation of low income
individuals, which is a disincentive not previously discussed in critiques of the US Welfare
system (Moffitt, 1992). Davis and You (2010) determined that the Thrifty Food Plan is
unrealistic and ’not so thrifty’ after all when labor costs are considered. They find that it
is extremely difficult to adhere to the nutritional guidelines for preparing healthful meals,
given the framework that the design of the food stamp program provides.2 Davis and You
(2009) estimated the time cost of food preparation for “typical” food stamp recipients and
found that they incur a much larger share of time costs than typical non-recipients. However,
these papers do not investigate the issue using data on actual food stamp recipiency status
or actual food expenditures, instead conclusions about the food stamp program are drawn
by examining “typical” participants as determined by individuals’ demographic characteris-
tics and by computing food expenditures from national averages.3 Yet, generalizing results
obtained from all lower income household to the narrow question of nutritional assistance
program efficacy might be dangerous. For example, the details of individual SNAP eligibility
are not observed in their data, and non-participation due to the effect of stigma associated
with receiving welfare (Moffitt, 1983) cannot be captured in the models used.
The critique of the Thrifty Food Plan in this literature is based on the idea that an
individual who receives food stamps is not able to take advantage of the full benefit of the
program because time costs are not considered. For example, in terms of direct cost of buying
a can of pinto beans is more expensive than purchasing dehydrated beans. Due to the nature
of the TFP, however, individuals receiving food stamps are required to purchase the cheaper
dehydrated beans in order to meet the budget constraints imposed on them by the program.
After considering the time that it takes to sort, rinse, soak, and boil the dehydrated beans,
the total cost of the beans (i.e. ingredient costs plus time costs) exceeds the total cost of the
pinto beans to a person who was able to simply purchase the can of precooked beans.
Since Vickery (1977) it has been clear that the time dimension is very important in
poverty issues. More recent research suggests that this is still true. For example, Aguiar and
Hurst (2007) have found that home production has decreased in the United States in the
last five decades, while leisure time has increased. However, they also note that inequality
in terms of leisure has increased substantially over the same time period and suggest that
wages and consumption by themselves do not adequately represent the welfare of individuals.
Meyer and Sullivan (2008) studied, among other things, changes in time use of single mother
headed families following the welfare reform of the 1990s. They found that time spent doing
housework and food production fell sharply to accommodate for more time spent working
in the market. While these results pertain to the general lower income population, these
2Of course, food does not only have to be prepared, but also eaten. For example, Hamermesh (2010) has
studied the frequency and duration of actual food consumption and their relationship to heath outcomes.
He found that eating occurs often as a secondary activity; that is, people eat while actually being engaged
in another activity. Since many foods can be taken ’to go’ once they have been prepared, the focus of this
research is the time cost associated with preparing the food, not actually eating it.
3Davis and You (2009) used single non-white, non-professional females, with some high school education
from metropolitan areas as the typical Food Stamp participant demographic profile.
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findings still underscore the importance of taking a closer look at the time cost of food
preparation in the context of nutrition assistance programs.
I contribute to the literature by estimating the time cost and total cost of food-at-home
for food stamp recipients as well as non-recipients using a structural model of individuals’
time allocation decisions. By making use of a new data set, I am able to estimate the time
cost of food preparation as well as the total cost of food that is prepared at home as the sum
of ingredient costs and time costs for actual food stamp recipients. Using data on actual
grocery expenditures of the individuals in my sample, I calculate the proportion of time cost
in relation to total cost of food at home for food stamp recipients and non-recipients. This
allows an insight into the extent of the difference in time cost of food preparation between
the two subgroups.
The following section develops the model used to estimate the shadow wage of household
work. Section 4.3 provides an overview of the data used in this study. Section 4.4 presents
the estimation and Section 4.5 discusses the results. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 The Model
The model is based on the theory of allocation of time developed by Becker (1965), and it
follows closely the model developed by Kiker and Oliveira (1990) and the work of Davis and
You (2009).
Individuals derive their utility from consumption and leisure such that
U = U(Y, L) (4.1)
where Y denotes total consumption and L stands for leisure. Total consumptions includes
home consumption (YH) and market consumption (YM) such that
Y = YH + YM (4.2)
Home production occurs according to the production function
YH = f(TH ,Z), (4.3)
where TH denotes the time devoted to home production and Z denotes some determinants
of productivity in home production. Market consumption satisfies the budget constraint
YM = wTM + I, (4.4)
where w is the market wage rate of the individual and TM denotes the time devoted to
market work. I is non-market income. An individual is time constrained such that
T = TH + TM + L. (4.5)
where T stands for total available time during the period of analysis.
The first order conditions of this straightforward setup require that time be allocated up






= w = MRSLY , (4.6)
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where s is the shadow wage and MRSLY is the marginal rate of substitution of leisure with
respect to goods.
Heckman (1974) describes how the well-known sample selection bias arises by ignoring
the corner solutions that occur due to people not working, and how it is important to
incorporate information from those individuals who do not work into estimation procedures.
As early as Gronau (1977) it became apparent that in the context of home production
it is important to consider yet another corner solution: those who do not participate in
household production. Some individuals choose to work exclusively in the market, some
work exclusively at home, and then again others choose to allocate positive time to both
market work and home production. That is, in the data we observe no wages, TM ≡ 0 and
TH > 0 for those working exclusively at home, while those exclusively working in the market
report TH ≡ 0 and TM > 0. Those working both in the market and at home report TM > 0
and TH > 0. Since the observed time allocations are outcomes of an individual’s utility
maximization and are bounded from below by zero, a model must account for both types of
censoring.
The following describes the empirical counterparts to the relevant elements in equation
(4.6). Let the market wage rate be determined according to the familiar Mincerian wage
equation
lnwi = Xiβ + εi, (4.7)
where Xi are market wage determinants of individual i, β is a vector of coefficients to be
estimated, and εi is a stochastic component with mean zero and variance σ2ε . The marginal
product for household work is described similarly by
ln si = Ziδ + γTHi + νi, (4.8)
where Zi contains determinants of the individual’s productivity at household work, δ is a
vector of coefficients to be estimated, and the parameter γ indicates the return to time spent
in household work. νi is a stochastic component with mean zero and variance σ2ν , which
captures unobserved determinants of the marginal productivity in household work such as
preferences and abilities.
The first order conditions of the model imply that (4.7)=(4.8). Setting the two equations
equal to each other and rearranging yields
T̃Hi = γ
−1 (Xiβ − Ziδ + εi − νi) (4.9)
where T̃Hi is a latent variable that indicates the time in household production required to
meet the first order condition in (4.6).
Only in an interior solution do we observe T̃Hi = THi. In this case the marginal product of
market work equals the marginal product of home production for some THi > 0 and TMi > 0
and we have lnwi = ln si. In this scenario the individual chooses to allocate some THi > 0
to home production and some TMi > 0 to market work. I label this group of individuals
B-type, indicating that both market work and home production are performed. However, if
the market wage exceeds the marginal product of work at home (that is lnwi > ln si), then
the individuals will be observed only working in the market and not at home. I label this
group of individuals M-type to indicate that they work in the market only. In this case we
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have THi = 0 and TMi > 0, and it follows that the latent variable T̃Hi < 0. Group H-type is
characterized by those individuals for whom the marginal product of household work exceeds
the market wage. Those are the individuals who perform household work only and do not
participate in market work. In these cases we observe TMi = 0 and 0 < THi ≤ T − L. The
latent variable is T̃Hi > THi.
The quantity of interest for this paper is the marginal product of household work. Define
(εi − νi) = ηi. Assuming that ν and η are jointly Gaussian with variance σ2ν and σ2η, as well
as correlation coefficient ρ, it is possible to jointly estimate the parameters of (4.7) and (4.8)
by maximum likelihood to obtain an estimate of the marginal product of household work. In
order to specify the likelihood, the three different groups (M , B, and H) must be considered
separately. For those working only in the market (Group M) we have T̃Hi ≤ 0 and using
(4.9) we have






where Φ(·) is the standard Gaussian cumulative distribution function and the term γTHi
drops out since, by definition, THi = 0 for all individuals in Group M .
On the other hand, for individuals who are observed only working at home but not in
the market (Group H) we get
P(T̃H ≥ T − L) = P(η ≤ Zδ + γTH −Xβ) = Φ
(




For the group of individuals engaged in both home production and market production,










= Ψ (lnw − Zδ − γTH , Zδ + γTH −Xβ) · |J | (4.12)
where Ψ(·) is the bivariate Gaussian probability density function and the Jacobian of the
transformation is −γ.
Combining the components from equations 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12, the joint likelihood of the






















This likelihood function forms the basis for the estimation of the unknown parameters
θ = (β′, δ′, γ, σν , ση, ρ)
′, which in return will allow a recovery of the expected shadow wage
s, by using the estimated coefficients in equation (4.8).
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4.3 Data
In order to estimate the model above, I require data on the actual time spent by individuals
doing household work, their market wage (if any), as well as data on various determinants
of individuals’ market wages and marginal products of household work. Moreover, data
regarding food expenditures and particularly expenditures for ingredients used for in-home
meal preparation are needed, as well as information regarding whether a respondent’s house-
hold receives food stamp benefits. I obtain these data from the American Time Use Survey
(ATUS), as well as the Current Population Survey (CPS) and its Food Security Supplement
(December Supplement).
The American Time Use Survey is administered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and has
been collecting data since 2003. The outgoing Current Population Survey panel is surveyed
and one person from the CPS household age 15 and up is selected as a “designated person”.
This designated person keeps a diary of one predetermined day’s activities. During a later
telephone interview all activities that occurred on the designated day are captured, the
activity type for each item is recorded and the duration of the activity is noted. Activity
types are coded according to a six digit multi-tier activity code. This provides a great deal
of detail regarding different activities and there are a total of 424 distinct activities that
are coded. The main item of interest here are the activities associated with the “household
work” tier. By adding the different activities in this tier I am able to obtain how many total
minutes each individual spent in household work as well as specifically household work that
is related to food preparation and clean-up on the interview day.
In addition to the time use variables, the ATUS also collects other basic information
on its respondents. Various household characteristics such as the household size, number of
children, marital status of the respondent, etc are available. Most importantly, the wage rate
of the individual is contained in the ATUS data. As mentioned before, all ATUS respondents
are members of the outgoing CPS panel. Therefore, it is possible to link the ATUS data set
to the CPS data in order to obtain other information that is not included in the ATUS data
directly. This includes, for instance, a respondent’s race as well as geographic variables. Via
the CPS data, it is also possible to link a subset of the ATUS respondents back to the Food
Security Supplement of the CPS, which contains data regarding the usual food expenditures
of the household.
The subset of data used for this study consists of the 2003-2009 sample years. Some
observations had to be excluded due to data inconsistencies. For example, some individuals
reported working a positive amount of time in the market but did not report a valid wage or
salary. Others reported not working in the market, but not working in the household either.
Since leisure takes up all available time for those individuals they cannot be included in my
model. I restrict my attention to individuals aged 18-65 since very few of those individuals
who are older than 65 report positive labor market hours. While the choice to retire is
itself the outcome of a utility optimization process, it is a different problem from the one
investigated here, and the model developed here is not suitable to account for retirement
decisions. The final sample contains a total of 57,590 individuals. Table 4.1 summarizes the
data.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics by Group
Variable Means
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Group Overall M B H
Female 0.607 0.313 0.603 0.708
Education: Less then HS 0.098 0.087 0.063 0.123
Education: High School 0.264 0.261 0.238 0.280
Education: Some College 0.292 0.291 0.288 0.294
Education: Bachelors Degree 0.225 0.229 0.252 0.208
Education: Masters Degree + 0.121 0.132 0.160 0.095
Age 41.839 39.908 42.194 42.283
Race: White 0.822 0.815 0.836 0.816
Race: Black 0.122 0.127 0.109 0.127
Race: Other 0.056 0.058 0.055 0.056
Ethnicity: Hispanic 0.137 0.147 0.115 0.146
Region: Northeast 0.183 0.172 0.192 0.180
Region: Midwest 0.253 0.255 0.263 0.246
Region: South 0.346 0.362 0.331 0.349
Region: West 0.219 0.211 0.213 0.225
Lives in Metropolitan Area 0.825 0.833 0.831 0.819
Union Member 0.105 0.127 0.141 0.077
Marital Status: Never Married 0.212 0.280 0.201 0.196
Marital Status: Married 0.593 0.568 0.590 0.602
Marital Status: Widowed 0.025 0.013 0.022 0.031
Marital Status: Separated 0.170 0.139 0.187 0.171
Observed on a Weekday 0.516 0.721 0.733 0.320
Professional Occupation 0.333 0.398 0.457 0.238
Enrolled in School 0.072 0.080 0.061 0.075
Has Employed Spouse 0.495 0.414 0.510 0.513
Number of Children in HH 1.063 0.915 1.020 1.137
Number of Adults in HH 1.954 2.032 1.907 1.956
Nominal Hourly Wage 20.921 21.041 20.851 -
Minutes in Home Production 107.600 0.000 80.745 159.536
Minutes in home Food Production 54.941 0.000 47.753 77.659
Observations 57,590 10,120 17,470 30,000
Note: Individuals who belong to Group M (column 2) work exclusively in the mar-
ket. Individuals in Group B (column 3) work in the household as well as at home.
Individuals in Group H (column 4) work exclusively in the household.
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Most variables are self explanatory.4 Professional is a dummy variable that indicates
whether the respondent reported working in management, professional, or related occu-
pations. The dummy variable Union Member indicates whether an individual is either a
member of a union (or other collective bargaining group), or, if she is not an actual member,
her work contract is subject to provisions negotiated by a collective bargaining group.
The means for the different Groups presented in Table 4.1 shed some light on the typical
individual working only at home, only in the market, or both. There are a total of 57,590
observations, out of which 30,000 work exclusively at home. 17,470 individuals reported
working both in the market and at home, while 10,120 respondents work only in the market.
The large proportion of individuals that were observed doing only household work is likely due
to the fact that weekends are oversampled in the Time Use Survey. Group H is predominantly
female, while Group M is predominantly male. Not surprisingly professionals are very likely
to be employed in the market.
Because the subject of interest for this paper is the time cost component of food prepa-
ration, some additional data are required in order to investigate how large the proportion
of the cost of time is with respect to the overall cost of food. I link the data used in the
previous section with the December Supplement of the Current Population Survey to ob-
tain information on the food expenditures incurred by the respondent households. The CPS
follows a 4-8-4 sampling scheme, meaning that households will be in the sample for four
consecutive months, then be out of the sample for 8 consecutive months before returning to
the sample for another 4 months. Since the American Time Use Survey samples households
from all outgoing CPS panels, not all the ATUS data will have corresponding entries in the
December CPS data. Due to the sampling scheme, four out of the twelve monthly panels
of the CPS answered the December Supplement. Therefore it is expected that about one
third of the respondent households from the ATUS should find a corresponding match in the
CPS Food Security Supplement. Indeed, out of the 57,590 households in the ATUS sample I
am able to match 18,740 households (32.5% of the original sample) with the December CPS
data.
Weekly food expenditure data are reported at the household level, while the time use
information (the time spent in food related household work) and estimated shadow wage
are available for only one individual in the household. This is due to the fact that only one
designated person from the CPS household is asked to complete the time diary collected by
the ATUS. However, while technically food stamps are received by an individual person, the
benefit is clearly received at the household level.
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics broken down by SNAP participation status. SNAP
participants are predominantly female, less educated, and more likely to be black than non-
participants. Participants are also more likely to be unmarried and on average have more
children. The household size is on average larger for SNAP participants despite the fact
that there are generally fewer adults present in those households. While SNAP participants’
market wage is significantly lower than that of non-participants, they spend more time in
home production and food production.
4I aggregated Race into three groups because the original data provide more detail than is useful. The
Race category ’Other’ contains all 15 possible races other than white-only or black-only, which are indicated
by themselves accordingly. Note that Race and Ethnicity are treated as two separate variables in the data,
meaning that it is possible to be white-hispanic, black-hispanic, etc.
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Education: Less then HS 0.087 0.292
Education: High School 0.256 0.262
Education: Some College 0.295 0.292
Education: Bachelors Degree 0.235 0.044
Education: Masters Degree + 0.126 0.009
Age 42.15 37.72
Race: White 0.831 0.666
Race: Black 0.113 0.276
Race: Other 0.056 0.058
Ethnicity: Hispanic 0.130 0.199
Region: Northeast 0.186 0.145
Region: Midwest 0.255 0.279
Region: South 0.341 0.386
Region: West 0.219 0.189
Lives in Metropolitan Area 0.829 0.744
Union Member 0.112 0.026
Marital Status: Never Married 0.202 0.355
Marital Status: Married 0.614 0.281
Marital Status: Widowed 0.026 0.032
Marital Status: Separated 0.158 0.332
Observed on a Weekday 0.523 0.505
Professional Occupation 0.349 0.058
Enrolled in School 0.069 0.099
Has Employed Spouse 0.514 0.171
Number of Children in HH 1.033 1.73
Number of Adults in HH 1.973 1.66
Hourly Wage 21.01 10.9
Minutes in Home Production 103.9 132.5
Minutes in home Food Production 53.52 66.95
Observations 17,805 935
4.4 Estimating the Model
The likelihood function used in the estimations is provided in equation (4.13). For the wage
equation estimation the regressors (i.e. the Xi) include an individual’s sex, education, race,
ethnicity, geographic region in the country, age, and the square of age. Indicator variables
for whether the individual lives in a metropolitan area, is a union member, is employed in
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a professional occupation, or is currently enrolled in school are included. Data regarding
experience or tenure on the job are not available, but the inclusion of age should help
mitigate this shortcoming. All things equal, union membership is usually associated with
higher wages; therefore the coefficient is expected to be positive, as is the coefficient on the
indicator for professional occupation categories. The indicator for current school enrollment
is included in order to control for individuals potentially accepting lower wages in the short
run in exchange for more education and higher wages in the future. The geographic indicators
(four very broadly defined regions: North, South, East, and West) are included to account
for potential differences of individuals across the country.
The determinants of the marginal product of household work equation (i.e. the Zi)
include some of the same variables that are used in the wage equation. Sex, Education, Age,
squared Age, Metropolitan Status, Race, and Ethnicity are contained in both Xi and Zi.
In addition there are some regressors that are expected to be correlated with the marginal
product of household work, but not with the individual’s wage. These include the number of
children present in the household, the number of adults present in the household, whether an
individual’s spouse is employed in the market, as well as the marital status of the individual.
Table 4.3 presents the results from the pseudo maximum likelihood estimation of the
model described above5 using the large sample with 57,590 observations. Both the market
wage equation, as well as the marginal product of household work equation include dummies
for the year during which the individual was observed, although those coefficients are not
reported in the interest of space.
The estimated coefficients have the expected signs and are mostly highly significant. For
instance, as expected, females earn less than males; the return to education is positive and
increasing with increasing educational attainments. We also observe the familiar increasing
(with a decreasing rate) returns to age.
Regarding the marginal product of household work equation, we see that females have
a higher marginal product than males. There are also positive returns to education that
are increasing with the level of educational attainment. However, the magnitude of the
coefficients is much smaller compared to the log wage equation. The number of children
in the household increases the marginal product of household work, while the number of
adults has a negative impact, though the absolute value of this negative impact is less than
the positive impact of another child. The indicator for whether the respondent’s spouse is
employed is positive and statistically significant as well. γ, the parameter on time spent
in household production, is negative and significant, which is expected due to diminishing
marginal returns to time spent in household work. The marginal product curves of household
work are downward sloping in the model and the data indicate that for every additional hour
spent in household work, the marginal product diminishes by about 17%.
It is interesting to note that the estimate of the correlation coefficient of ν and η =
(ε − ν), ρ̂ is significantly negative. This means that the unobservables picked up in the
5The maximization was carried out using the BHHH algorithm for numerical optimization. Other (Quasi-
Newton) methods all provided very similar results. Analytic gradients used in the optimization were tested for
accuracy against their numerical counterparts. Starting values were chosen based on the Heckman Selection
model where the marginal product equation from the present model served as the selection equation in the
Heckman procedure. Results are highly robust to different choices of starting values (e.g. random starting
values).
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Variable Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE)
Intercept 1.312∗∗ (0.052) 2.080∗∗ (0.076)
Female −0.242∗∗ (0.009) 0.253∗∗ (0.021)
Education: High School 0.178∗∗ (0.017) 0.042∗ (0.021)
Education: Some College 0.290∗∗ (0.017) 0.140∗∗ (0.022)
Education: Bachelor’s Degree 0.478∗∗ (0.018) 0.340∗∗ (0.023)
Education: Master’s Degree 0.607∗∗ (0.019) 0.470∗∗ (0.026)
Age 0.046∗∗ (0.002) 0.038∗∗ (0.003)
Age Squared −0.001∗∗ (0.000) −0.000∗∗ (0.000)
Metro 0.157∗∗ (0.010) 0.159∗∗ (0.012)
Race: Black −0.094∗∗ (0.012) −0.118∗∗ (0.015)
Race: Other −0.010 (0.016) −0.018 (0.020)
Ethnicity: Hispanic −0.138∗∗ (0.012) −0.122∗∗ (0.015)
Weekday 0.052∗∗ (0.011) −0.053∗∗ (0.025)
Region: Midwest −0.074∗∗ (0.011) −0.124∗∗ (0.014)
Region: South −0.081∗∗ (0.010) −0.130∗∗ (0.013)
Region: West −0.005 (0.011) 0.002 (0.013)
Union 0.116∗∗ (0.008)
Professional Occupation 0.272∗∗ (0.009)
Currently in School −0.055∗∗ (0.010)
Widowed 0.019 (0.023)
Divorced 0.018 (0.011)
Never married −0.024∗ (0.011)
Spouse Employed 0.121∗∗ (0.010)
Number of Children in HH 0.074∗∗ (0.004)








Number of Observations 57,590
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗: 5%, ∗∗:1%
residual of the marginal product equation are not strongly positively correlated with the
stochastic component of the wage equation. The two may even be negatively correlated.
This result is intuitive, and given that the stochastic components include unobservables such
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Marketwork Only 31.34 26.20
Both Household Work and Market Work 29.18 24.72
Household Work Only 29.82 23.29
as personal preferences and abilities, the result is somewhat expected as well: all things equal
those individuals with, say, unobserved talents in aluminum welding may command a high
market wage, but will find it difficult to apply this particular talent in home production. An
appropriate test of overall significance involves the hypothesis that all slope coefficients other
than γ are equal to zero.6 A likelihood ratio test rejects this hypothesis at all conventional
levels of significance.
From the estimation results it is easy to back out the expected shadow wage of home
production. Since the expectation of a log-normally distributed variable is E[X] = exp(µ +
σ2/2) we can use equation (4.8), substitute the coefficients obtained during the estimation




I compare several outcomes between SNAP participants and non-participants: time spent
in food preparation, the time cost of food preparation, the total cost of food preparation,
and the share of time cost in food preparation. Holding home production YH constant, the
substitution of time for ingredients will cause the time spent doing household work, THi, to
increase as the marginal product of household work, si, decreases. This is already confirmed
in Table 4.2: SNAP participants spend on average a significant 13.43 minutes more each day
in food preparation at home.
Table 4.4 presents the means of shadow wages for individuals in the sample, broken down
by SNAP participation. Food stamp recipients have an average shadow wage of household
work of$23.82, while the average shadow wage for non-recipients is $29.90. This difference
is statistically significant with a p-value of < 0.000.8
6When attempting to test for the overall significance of the model there are two things to consider: First,
the hypothesis that all the regression coefficients except the intercepts (and variances) are zero is meaningless
here when they include γ; in fact, I require γ < 0 for identification. A technical problem is that the Jacobian
of the transformation term in the log-likelihood is infinite whenever γ = 0, but this is merely a symptom of
the fact that the first order condition of the model only has a unique solution when γ 6= 0.
7A Smearing Estimate along the lines of Duan (1983) is often the preferred method of computing the
expected response after fitting linear regression models with transformed scales. However, since the left hand
side of the specification is not directly observed (though the shadow wage follows a linear specification in
the parameters, the model is not a linear regression per se), these methods do not apply here.
8All differences in this paper are tested using a Welch’s t-test in order to account for the possibility of
unequal variances of the two samples.
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The time cost of food preparation is obtained by multiplying the hourly shadow wage with
the actual time spent by each individual in food preparation, presentation, and clean up.9
Whether the incurred time cost increases, decreases, or remains constant as the marginal
product of household work varies will depend on the elasticity of demand for time in produc-
tion with respect to the shadow wage. Columns (1)-(3) in Table 4.5a and 4.5b present the
results of combining the hourly shadow wage with the actual time spent in food production
at home. Panel (a) presents the results for those respondents not receiving food stamps and
panel (b) displays results for households that receive food stamps.
The mean of the time cost of food preparation when considering the entire household is
$28.27 per day for SNAP non-participants and $24.56 per day for SNAP participants (see
column (1) in Table 4.5). The difference is statistically and economically significant. The
p-value of the difference of these means is < 0.000. SNAP participants have a lower shadow
wage of household work compared to non-participants (see Table 4.4) and they also incur a
lower time cost of food preparation and cleanup. This pattern is consistent when considering
separately those individuals who work both in the market and at home (Column (2) in Table
4.5), as well as those who work exclusively in the household (Column (3) in Table 4.5).
In order to obtain the total cost of food preparation at home, I add the cost of ingredients
to the time cost of each individual. Ingredient costs are reported as a weekly amount and
therefore I divide by seven to achieve daily estimates. Ingredients used in food preparation
are spread across all individuals in the household. However, the time cost of food preparation
is only incurred by the one individual preparing the meal as identified in the data. Therefore,
I also calculate the total cost and its components per household member by dividing the
individual estimates by the total household size.
The difference in the ingredient costs are insignificant. Note that the ingredient cost
for food stamp recipients include any groceries purchased using food stamp benefits. Those
households who do not receive food stamps spend on average $15.37 per day on ingredients,
while households who do receive food stamps spend an average of $15.13. The difference of
only 24 cents is very small and the p-value of this difference is 0.580. However, after adjusting
for household size, food stamp recipients spend a statistically significant $0.62 less per person
per day on food ingredients (the p-value is < 0.000). Note that SNAP participants families
are larger (see Table 4.2) and therefore their per capita spending is lower.
By adding the time cost and ingredient cost components I obtain a total daily cost of food
at home for a household in general population of about $44.15, whereas the daily total cost
of food at home is $40.08 for food stamp recipients. Note that the total cost was computed
at the individual level and the reported mean in table 4.5 is the mean of the individual sums.
9One potentially strong assumption has to be made here: The marginal productivites of different types of
household work is assumed to be identical. Ideally, each activity such as vacuuming, taking out the garbage,
or cooking would be modeled separately and have different marginal productivities associated with them.
Due to the multitude of different possible activities and the design of the model used in this study this is
not possible.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Group All B H All B H All B H
Entire Household 28.27 21.62 32.19 15.37 15.21 15.47 44.15 36.90 48.85












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Group All B H All B H All B H
TOTAL
Entire Household 24.56 20.43 25.52 15.13 15.64 15.00 40.08 36.66 40.90
Per HH Member 9.40 6.64 10.04 5.02 4.55 5.13 14.45 11.35 15.19
Net of FS
Entire Household 24.56 21.62 32.19 8.36 8.51 8.32 33.31 29.52 34.21
Per HH Member 9.40 9.20 12.88 2.87 2.49 2.95 12.30 9.29 13.01
“Net of FS” means that the total food stamp benefit was subtracted from total ingredient expenditures.
Individuals in Group B work in the household as well as at home. Individuals in Group H work exclusively in
the household. The column heading “All” includes individuals from Group B and Group H. Those individuals
who work exclusively in the market (Group M) do not perform any houshold work and therefore all values
in this table are zero for that group.
This implies a difference of $4.07 in the means of total cost between food stamp recipients
and non-recipients. The p-value of the difference of the means is < 0.000.
So far the ingredient costs have included all items purchased with food stamps. Food
stamps (partially) subsidize the ingredient costs and therefore not the entire total cost of
food preparation is actually borne by the individual or household. In order to obtain an
estimate of the total out-of-pocket cost of food preparation I use the total food ingredient
expenditure reported by the household and subtract the amount of food stamp support
received.10 When subtracting the food stamp benefit received to obtain the total cost of
10The dollar amount of food stamps received by the household is available for the month of November
preceding the December CPS interview. Since that amount is reported as a monthly total, I divide by 30 in
order to obtain a per diem value.
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food as an out-of-pocket expense of the individual food stamp recipient, the estimated total
cost is reduced to $33.31 (See Table 4.5b).
Finally, it is useful to also compare the time cost shares in food preparation at home
between SNAP participants and non-participants. The time cost shares are calculated by
respectively dividing columns (1), (2), and (3) in Table 4.5 into columns (7), (8), and (9)
of the same Table. Time cost accounts for 64.0% of total costs for SNAP non-participants,
while SNAP participants incur 61.3% of their total costs as time costs. This includes in-
gredients purchased with SNAP benefits in the denominator. Therefore we can conclude
that using ingredients purchased with food stamps does not increase the time cost share for
meals prepared at home for SNAP participants over non-participants. Not only do SNAP
participants incur a lower time cost of food preparation at home, but also the time cost share
of preparing food at home is smaller for SNAP participants. Comparing time cost shares
over food expenditures net of SNAP benefits is not informative since, all other things equal,
any positive food stamp benefit will increase that share compared to non-recipients.
Note that recent research has indicated that SNAP participants significantly underreport
their own participation in SNAP programs (Bollinger and David, 2001; Meyer and Goerge,
2010). On the other hand it is rare that a SNAP non-participant would identify herself as
a participant (Bollinger and David, 1997). Misreporting of SNAP benefits seems to occur
almost exclusively at the extensive margin, not at the intensive margin, and so it is likely
that some of the individuals that I have identified themselves as non-participants actually
do receive food stamps (Meyer and Sullivan, 2007). Since SNAP participants have a lower
shadow wage of household production, it is likely that the shadow wage rates are actually
higher, and the difference of the shadow wage as well as the difference of the total cost of food
preparation between SNAP participants and non-participants represents a lower bound.11
4.6 Conclusions
This study confirms that the time cost of preparing food at home is a significant proportion
of the total cost incurred by an individual preparing food at home. A structural model of
time allocation between market work and household production is estimated using data from
the American Time Use Survey as well as data from the Current Population Survey’s Food
Security Supplement concerning individuals’ food expenditures and food stamp program
participation.
The average household not participating in the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance pro-
gram incurs about $28.27 in time cost per day by preparing meals at home. In terms of
individuals, the average time cost is $11.51 per person per day across households. Food
stamp recipients incur a significantly smaller time cost of $24.56 per day per household or
$9.40 per day per individual. Time costs account for 64% of the total cost of food at home
for SNAP non-participants, whereas time costs account for about 61% of the total cost of
food at home for SNAP participants.
Previous literature has questioned whether the total cost of food preparation is higher for
food stamps recipients compared to non recipients due to the increased amount of time that
11I thank a referee for this insight.
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is spent preparing food when following the Thrifty Food Plan. My results show that food
stamp recipients have an estimated shadow wage of home production that is significantly
lower than non-recipients. My results also show that the shadow wage of home production
of food stamp recipients is low enough so as to offset the increased amount of time spent in
the kitchen. As a result, the total cost of food preparation at home is still significantly lower
for food stamp recipients compared to non-recipients, even after accounting for extra time
inputs.
Future research should address how the time cost of food preparation at home impacts
the nutritional quality of the food being prepared. The details of what is prepared at home
are not observed in the data used for this paper, and therefore all meals are considered equal.
However, if nutritional quality and the time spent preparing meals are substitutes, then it
is important to consider an individual’s shadow wage of household production in policies
designed to target important outcomes, such as obesity. Results from this paper may be
used to develop a model that is able to account for both how much is cooked at home, as
well as what is cooked at home.
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Chapter 5. Summary and Conclusion
In this dissertation I presented three essays that investigated the impact of income on
the well-being of families and children.
The first paper investigated how exogenous changes in the amount of child benefit received
by families in Germany impacted the circumstances related to well-being of their children.
The German child benefit is paid as an unconditional cash transfer to all families with
children, but it is the stated intention of the policy maker that the child benefit be used
to ensure that children’s needs in terms of nutrition and housing (among other things) are
met. Due to the unconditional nature of the benefit and the fact that the benefit is paid in
cash, any money paid to the families is fully fungible. I investigate whether parents really
do use the child benefit for its intended purpose, or whether they may use the benefit for
expenditures on other commodities that are unrelated to the well-being of children.
I find that households primarily increase their per capita food expenditures in response
to exogenous increases in child benefit. Households spend on average between 49 and 74
cents out of every additional Euro of child benefit on food, which should improve nutrition.
Households also use child benefit to improve their housing conditions: they are more likely
to own their home instead of renting, and are more likely to live in a larger home if they are
renters. I find no evidence that child benefit increases smoking of parents I also do not find
any evidence that child benefit income causes parents to increases drinking of alcohol.
These improvements in the circumstances related to child well-being are only observed
when the children in the household are young. Families may be eligible for child benefit until
the children are up to 25 years old; however, I find that once children in the household are
older than 18 years of age, parents no longer use additional child benefit income to improve
nutrition or housing conditions. Instead, parents of older children are more likely to use
child benefit income for their own personal entertainment activities such as going to the
movies or pop music concerts. Parents of older children are also more likely than parents of
younger children to use child benefit income to attend cultural events such as classical music
concerts, the opera, public lectures, or theater performances. These activities are unrelated
to the well-being of children. On the other hand, parents are more likely to use child benefit
to go on day trips or short vacations when children are young. This includes trips to the
zoo or other excursions, and therefore those activities may be related to the well-being of
children.
The effect of child benefit income on families with young children is larger for low-income
households compared to high-income households. Households that are considered to be at-
risk of poverty spend about 4 more cents of every additional Euro of child benefit on food,
compared to households not at-risk of poverty. However, households at-risk of poverty do
not differ in their behavior.
I also find that there is a significant labeling effect for the child benefit, indicating that
households treat child benefit income differently compared to income from other sources.
An increase in child benefit income leads to larger improvements in nutrition and housing
conditions compared to an identical increase in general household income.
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My results indicate that the child benefit does have the desired effect of improving nutri-
tion and housing for families with non-adult children. Indeed, parents of young children are
more likely to spend an additional Euro of child benefit towards those commodities copared
to an additional Euro out of other sources. Parents are also not using child benefit income
for increases in cigarette smoking or drinking of alcohol. However, once children are older,
parents no longer improve nutrition and housing conditions when child benefit increases.
Rather they use the child benefit for their own social activities and entertainment.
The second paper investigated the impact of income on infant health. Since maternal
income or household income are likely correlated with mother attributes and household
characteristics that may directly impact the health of an infant, I employ an instrumental
variables approach in order to account for this endogeneity issue. I used birth records from
nearly 85 million births between 1978 and 2004 combined with micro data on income from
the Current Population Survey’s Annual Demographic File for this study.
I constructed a state-year-level measure of skill biased technology change that is based
on the literature on wage inequality. Using a two-sample instrumental variables strategy
allowed me identify the causal impact of mothers earnings on the birth weight of the new-
borns. I also estimated health input demands for negative health inputs such as smoking
and drinking, and positive health inputs such as prenatal medical care consumption of the
mothers. Together with the results regarding birth weight production, the results from input
demand estimations provide insights into the channels through which the impact of income
on infant health operates.
The results show that the impact of mothers’ earning on infant health varies significantly
depending on mothers’ marital status and education level. For low-skill mothers (those with
at most a high school education) an increase in real weekly earnings increases the number
of prenatal medical care visits and shortens the delay in the initiation of prenatal care. The
opposite is true for high-skill mothers (those mothers with at least some college education).
Smoking participation and the propensity to consume alcohol go up with income for low-
skilled mothers regardless of their marital status. On the other hand, high-skill unmarried
mothers reduce their smoking and drinking while high-skill married mothers increase smoking
and drinking. The impact of income on the consumption of prenatal care does not depend
on marital status.
The impact of mothers’ earnings on birth weight is different between low-skilled married
and low-skilled unmarried mothers. For married low-skilled mothers the net effect of im-
proved prenatal medical care together with the increased propensity to consume of alcohol
and cigarettes results in an improvement in birth weight for their children. This net effect
generates a decline in birth weight among unmarried low-skilled mothers. Although the pre-
natal care consumption declines as income rises for all high-skilled mothers, the birth weight
of infants of unmarried high-skilled mothers goes up because these mothers’ propensity to
smoke and drink goes down as their income goes up. On the other hand, the birth weight
of the newborns of unmarried low-skilled mothers goes down because these mothers initiate
drinking and smoking when income rises. The direction of the change in birth weight as a
response to a change in income is not uniform among the groups of mothers analyzed. In
each of the mentioned groups of women, the net effect of income on birth weight is small.
The third paper investigated the time cost of preparing meals at home. The study
confirmed that the time cost of preparing food at home is a significant proportion of the total
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cost incurred by an individual preparing food at home. I used data from the American Time
Use Survey as well as data from the Current Population Survey’s Food Security Supplement
on individuals’ food expenditures and food stamp program participation. I estimated a
structural model of time allocation between market work and household production in order
to determine individuals’ shadow wage of home production.
I estimated the total cost of food production at home and I found that the total cost of
food preparation at home is still significantly lower for food stamp recipients compared to
non-recipients, even after accounting for extra time inputs. This is due to a significantly lower
shadow wage of home production for individuals receiving food stamps. Concentrating on
time cost, I find that the average household not participating in the Supplemental Nutritional
Assistance program incurs about $28.27 in time cost per day by preparing meals at home.
Food stamp recipients incur a significantly smaller time cost of $24.56 per day per household.
As a proportion of total cost of food at home, time costs account for 64% of the total cost of
food at home for SNAP non-participants, whereas time costs account for about 61% of the
total cost of food at home for SNAP participants.
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